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What Is an International Crime?
(A Revisionist History)
Kevin Jon Heller*
The question “what is an international crime?” has two aspects. First, it asks us to identify which acts
qualify as international crimes. Second, and more fundamentally, it asks us to identify what is distinctive
about an international crime.
Some disagreement exists concerning the first issue, particularly with regard to torture and terrorism.
But nearly all states, international tribunals, and ICL scholars take the same position concerning the
second issue, insisting that an act qualifies as an international crime if—and only if—that act is
universally criminal under international law.
This definition of an international crime leads to an obvious question: how exactly does an act become
universally criminal under international law? One answer, the “direct criminalization thesis” (DCT), is
that certain acts are universally criminal because they are directly criminalized by international law
itself, regardless of whether states criminalize them. Another answer, the “national criminalization the-
sis” (NCT), rejects the idea that international law directly criminalizes particular acts. According to the
NCT, certain acts are universally criminal because international law obligates every state in the world to
criminalize them.
This Article argues that if we take positivism seriously, as every international criminal tribunal since
Nuremberg has insisted we must, the NCT provides the only coherent explanation of how international
law can deem certain acts to be universally criminal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question posed by the title of this Article has two aspects. First, it
asks us to identify which acts qualify as international crimes. Second, and
more fundamentally, it asks us to identify what is distinctive about an inter-
national crime—what makes an international crime different than a transna-
tional crime or an ordinary domestic crime.
A. The Nature of International Crimes
The descriptive aspect of the question is easily answered: nearly all inter-
national criminal law (“ICL”) scholars agree that the category of “true” in-
ternational crimes is limited to war crimes, crimes against humanity,
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genocide, and aggression.1 A few scholars would add acts such as torture2
and terrorism3 to the list, but they remain in the distinct minority.
At first glance, there appears to be little consensus concerning the concep-
tual aspect of the question. After all, scholars often claim that there is no
agreement concerning what makes an international crime distinctive. Ac-
cording to O’Keefe, for example, “[n]o common understanding, let alone
common definition” of an international crime exists.4 Similarly, Bassiouni
says that “[t]he writings of scholars are uncertain, if not tenuous, as to what
they deem to be the criteria justifying the establishment of crimes under
international law.”5
But that is not actually true. In fact, nearly all scholars share a common
understanding of what makes an international crime distinctive: namely,
that it involves an act that international law deems universally criminal. The
international law requirement is what distinguishes an international crime
from a domestic crime: although some acts that qualify as domestic crimes
are universally criminal—murder, for example6—their universality derives
not from international law, but from the fact that every state in the world
has independently decided to criminalize them. And the universality re-
quirement is what distinguishes an international crime from a transnational
crime: although the criminality of a transnational crime emanates from in-
ternational law—a treaty requiring a particular act to be domestically
criminalized—international law does not deem a transnational crime univer-
sally criminal, because it leaves the decision to criminalize to states them-
selves. If a state does not want to criminalize the commission of a
transnational crime, it can simply decline to ratify the treaty in question.
B. The Basis of Universality
Defining an international crime as an act that international law deems
universally criminal, however, raises a critical question: how exactly does an
act such as genocide become universally criminal under international law?
Two very different answers to that question are possible, and the goal of this
article is to adjudicate between them. The first answer, what I call the “di-
rect criminalization thesis” (DCT), is that certain acts are universally crimi-
nal because they are directly criminalized by international law itself,
1. See, e.g., Terje Einarsen, The Concept of Universal Crimes in International Law 21
(2012).
2. See, e.g., Roger O’Keefe, International Criminal Law 47 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law 148 (3rd ed. 2003);
cf. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law, Case No. STL-11-01/I,
para. 102 (Feb. 16, 2011).
4. O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 47. R
5. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: The Ratione Materiae of International Criminal Law, in I
International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects, and Content 142 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd
ed. 2008).
6. See John Mikhail, Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal?, 75 Brook. L. Rev. 497, 503 (2009).
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regardless of whether states criminalize them. All modern ICL scholars take
this position. Cassese, for example, says that the international crimes are
“premised on the general notion that international legal prescriptions are
capable of imposing obligations directly on individuals, without the inter-
mediary of the state wielding authority over such individuals.”7 Cryer simi-
larly notes that “the fundamental point to understand about these crimes” is
that “States have decided that international law, in exceptional circum-
stances, ought to bypass the domestic legal order, and criminalise behaviour
directly.”8 And Triffterer says that what is distinctive about international
criminality is that “individuals can be punished even if there exists no corre-
sponding punishability under their domestic law and jurisdiction or any
other national legal system purporting to exercise jurisdiction.”9 These ex-
amples could be multiplied indefinitely.10
The second answer, what I call the “national criminalization thesis”
(NCT), rejects the idea that international law bypasses domestic law by di-
rectly criminalizing particular acts. According to the NCT, certain acts are
universally criminal under international law, and thus qualify as true inter-
national crimes, because international law obligates every state in the world
to criminalize and prosecute them.11 No modern ICL scholar has taken this
approach, although intimations of it date back to Grotius.
Which thesis is correct? This Article argues that it depends on whether
we adopt a naturalist or positivist approach to international law. Naturalism
is a deductive methodology, deriving the basic principles of international
law “not from any deliberate human choice or decision, but from principles
of justice which [have] a universal and eternal validity and which [can] be
7. Cassese, supra note 3, at 9. R
8. Robert Cryer, The Doctrinal Foundations of International Criminalization, in International Crimi-
nal Law, supra note 5, at 108. R
9. Otto Triffterer, Preliminary Remarks, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 25 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).
10. See, e.g., Claus Kress, International Criminal Law, para. 10, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Pub-
lic International Law (2009), http://www.uni-koeln.de/jur-fak/kress/Materialien/Chef/HP882010/
ICL.pdf (“International criminal law strictu sensu establishes criminal responsibility directly under inter-
national law.”); Neil Boister, Transnational Criminal Law?, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 953, 962 (2003)
(“Uniquely, however, these core offences provide for individual criminal liability for their violation, even
in the absence of a domestic prohibition, and are now subject to a direct enforcement scheme where the
individual may be prosecuted before a permanent international criminal court.”); Kai Ambos, Treatise
on International Criminal Law: Foundations and General Part 54 (2013) (“ICL stricto sensu
. . . comprises the totality of international law norms of a penal nature which conjoin typical legal
consequences of criminal law with a decisive conduct – namely the international crime – and as such can
be applied directly.”); Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 20 Isr. L. Rev. 206, 207 (1985)
(“When an individual human being contravenes an international duty binding him directly, he commits
an international offence and risks his life, liberty or property.”); Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View?, 93 Am. J. Int’l
L. 302, 308 (1999) (arguing that “truly international” crimes are predicated on “rules establishing
individual criminal responsibility directly at the international level”).
11. Except where required, I will refer to this joint obligation simply as an “obligation to
criminalize.”
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discovered by pure reason.”12 Positivism, by contrast, derives international
legal rules inductively, on the basis of what states do and say.13
Every international criminal tribunal has insisted that international
crimes are positivist, not naturalist, phenomena.14 As this Article will
demonstrate, however, no extant theory of positivism—not even so-called
“instant custom”—is capable of justifying the idea that certain acts are di-
rectly criminalized by international law. On the contrary, if we take positiv-
ism seriously, the NCT provides the only coherent explanation of how
international law can deem certain acts to be universally criminal. Maintain-
ing fidelity to the idea of direct criminalization thus requires rejecting posi-
tivism in favor of naturalism—with all of naturalism’s inherent limitations.
C. Roadmap
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II shows that nearly every
definition of an international crime offered by states, international tribunals,
and ICL scholars emphasizes the universal criminality of the act in question
under international law. Part III explains why the most promising material
sources for direct criminalization, such as multilateral treaties and unani-
mously-adopted General Assembly resolutions, do not provide a sufficient
positivist basis for the DCT. Part IV demonstrates that the national-
criminalization thesis has a much stronger, though still not incontestable,
positivist foundation. Part V explores how adopting the NCT requires us to
reconceptualize the traditional distinction between international and trans-
national crimes, because a number of transnational crimes have an even
stronger positivist claim to international status than some of the interna-
tional crimes, particularly aggression. Finally, Part VI reflects on the impli-
cations of the analysis provided in the previous parts, focusing on the
disquieting idea that no conception of an international crime, not even the
NCT’s, may be able to completely escape the specter of naturalism.
12. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 15 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th
ed. 1997); see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, Natural Law and Customary Law, 68 Zeitschrift fu¨r
Ausla¨ndisches O¨ffentliches Recht & Vo¨lkerrecht 69, 70-71 (2008) (“The concept of natural
law refers to rules and principles deducible from nature, reason, or the idea of justice.”); Cryer, Doctrinal,
supra note 8, at 111 (noting that natural law theories deduce the law “from a priori principles, grounded R
either on a theological base, an assumed consensus of rational thought, or a (similarly assumed) social
necessity.”).
13. See, e.g., Simma & Paulus, supra note 10, at 304 (“Positivism can also be understood as the strict R
separation of the law in force, as derived from formal sources that are part of a unified system of law, from
nonlegal factors such as natural reason, moral principles and political ideologies.”).
14. See, e.g., Einarsen, supra note 1, at 116 (IMT); Robert Cryer, The Philosophy of International Crimi- R
nal Law, in History of International Law 242 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 2011) (IMTFE); id. at
253 (SCSL) id. at 253-54 (ICC); Birgit Schlu¨tter, Developments in Customary International Law: Theory
and the Practice of the International Court of Justice and the International Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and Yugoslavia 98 (2010) (ICTY & ICTR). For the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, see the Inter-
locutory Decision on the Applicable Law, supra note 3, at para. 85. R
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II. UNIVERSAL CRIMINALITY
As noted above, O’Keefe believes that there is no common definition of
an international crime. It is true that courts and scholars have offered very
different formulations in the decades since Nuremberg. Beneath the defini-
tional welter, however, lies a common assumption about what makes an
international crime distinctive: namely, that it involves an act that interna-
tional law deems universally criminal. International crimes are universal
crimes; they are criminal and punishable no matter where in the world they
are committed.
A. States
States have consistently affirmed the universality of international crimes.
Most importantly, in terms of state practice,15 nearly 150 states have
adopted legislation that allows their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction
over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or aggression.16 Uni-
versal jurisdiction is predicated on the idea of universal criminality, given
that it permits states to prosecute acts “without regard to where the crime
was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the
nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising
such jurisdiction.”17 If international crimes can be prosecuted no matter
where they are committed, they are criminal everywhere.
State practice concerning universal jurisdiction is also routinely accompa-
nied by statements—opinio juris—explicitly affirming that international
crimes are criminal no matter where they are committed. A number of states
focus on the nature of the acts themselves: Belarus argues that international
crime[s] are “universally condemned,”18 while Italy says they are “univer-
sally abhorred;”19 Brazil claims that international crimes “shock [ . . . ] the
15. See International Law Commission, Identification of Customary International Law, Text of the Draft
Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee 2, 68th Session of the ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/
L.872 (May 30, 2016); International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law 14, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference (2000) (noting that domes-
tic legislation counts as state practice).
16. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World –
2012 Update 12 (2012).
17. Universal Jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious crimes
under international law 21 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
18. Statement Submitted by Belarus, reply to U.N. Secretary-General, The Scope and Application of the
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Sixty-Fifth Session of the General Assembly U.N. Doc. A/65/181 (July
29, 2010) [hereinafter Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction] at 1, http://www.un.org/en/ga/
sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Belarus_E.pdf.
19. Statement Submitted by Italy, reply to U.N. Secretary-General, The Scope and Application of the
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Sixty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly U.N. Doc. A/66/93 (June
20, 2011) [hereinafter Sixty-Sixth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction] at 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/
sixth/66/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Italy.pdf.
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conscience of all humanity,”20 and South Africa claims that international
crimes are “crimes against mankind” because they offend “the international
community as a whole.”21 Other states focus more on the universal punisha-
bility of international crimes: Kenya says universal jurisdiction exists to per-
mit “the trial of international crimes committed by anybody, anywhere in
the world,”22 an idea that Argentina claims is “universally accepted;”23 El
Salvador insists that international crimes protect values “which must not be
disregarded under any circumstances”24; and Chile simply describes the ex-
istence of universal jurisdiction as reflecting the “universalization of jus-
tice.”25 And still other states emphasize both sides of the equation.
Belgium, for example, insists that because international crimes are “univer-
sally condemned,” they “cannot go unpunished and must therefore be uni-
versally suppressed.”26
Domestic courts applying international law have also routinely affirmed
that international crimes are universally criminal. Most famously, in Eich-
mann, the District Court of Jerusalem invoked “[t]he universal character of
the crimes in question” to justify its right to punish Eichmann for crimes
against humanity committed before the State of Israel even existed.27 The
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the same analysis in
Demjanjuk, noting that the crimes for which Israel wanted the defendant
extradited have been “universally recognized and condemned by the com-
munity of nations.”28 Similarly, In Pinochet No. 3, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
wrote for the majority that “[c]rimes against humanity are crimes not
against a state but against individuals and are triable anywhere.”29 Lord
Phillips agreed, adding that because “[t]here are some categories of crime of
such gravity that they shock the consciousness of mankind and cannot be
20. U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., 11th mtg. of the 6th Comm. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.11 (Nov. 6,
2014), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/570/17/PDF/N1457017.pdf?OpenElement.
21. Statement Submitted by South Africa, reply to Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 18, at 2. R
22. Statement Submitted by Kenya, reply to Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction, supra
note 18, at 1. http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Kenya.pdf. R
23. Statement Submitted by Argentina, reply to Sixty-Sixth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction
supra note 19, at 1. http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Argen- R
tina%20(S%20to%20E).pdf.
24. Statement Submitted by El Salvador, reply to Sixty-Sixth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction
supra note 19, at 4. http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/ R
El%20Salvador%20(S%20to%20E).pdf.
25. Statement Submitted by Chile, reply to Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction, supra
note 18, at 3. http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Chile_E.pdf. R
26. Statement Submitted by Belgium, reply to Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction, supra
note 18, at 1. http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Belgium_E.pdf. R
27. CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, ¶ 11 (1961) (Isr.).
28. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985).
29. Reg. v Bow Street Magistrate, Ex p. Pinochet (No 3), 1 A.C. [2000] 157 (Opinion of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson).
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tolerated by the international community. . . [a]ny individual who commits
such a crime offends against international law.”30
B. ICTs
The universality of international crimes has been a central theme in inter-
national jurisprudence. One of the most famous statements in ICL is the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal’s insistence in the Hostage case that “[a]n in-
ternational crime is such an act universally recognized as criminal.”31 The
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) uses similar language, connecting inter-
national criminality to the universality of customary international law: “in-
ternational crimes are those offences that are considered so heinous and
contrary to universal values that the whole community condemns them
through customary rules.”32 And the ICTY makes an even stronger claim,
insisting that international crimes are “universally condemned wherever
they occur,”33 because they are “peremptory norms of international law
or jus cogens.” 34
The Rome Statute does not explicitly state that international crimes are
criminal no matter where they are committed. But universality is neverthe-
less implicit in the Preamble’s insistence that international crimes “deeply
shock the conscience of humanity” and “threaten the peace, security and
well-being of the world.”35 The Preamble also emphasizes that “the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must
not go unpunished,”36 reinforcing the idea that (at least) war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide are universally criminal.37 If international
crimes are not universally criminal, they are not universally punishable.
C. The ICJ
The ICJ has rarely addressed the nature of international crimes. The pri-
mary exception is its 1951 Genocide Advisory Opinion, in which the Court
adopted a universalizing explanation of why genocide is an international
crime:
30. Id. at 243 (Opinion of Lord Phillips).
31. United States of America v Wilhelm List et al. (Hostage), XI Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 1241 (1949).
32. STL Interlocutory Decision, supra note 3, para 134. R
33. Prosecutor v. Furundzˇija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 156 (Dec. 10, 1998).
34. Prosecutor v Kupres˘kic´, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 520 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). “Jus cogens” refers to a small class of fundamental norms of interna-
tional law that are non-derogable—that prohibit states from assuming treaty obligations inconsistent
with the norm. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 12, at 57-58. R
35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-
inafter Rome Statute].
36. Id., Preamble, para. 4.
37. See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 83
(3rd ed., 2007).
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The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of
the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as “a crime
under international law” involving a denial of the right of exis-
tence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the con-
science of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and
which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations. The first consequence arising from this concep-
tion is that the principles underlying the Convention are princi-
ples which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without any conventional obligation.38
The idea that genocide is universally criminal is woven into the fiber of this
statement. Genocide not only “shocks the conscience of mankind” and is
contrary “to the spirit and aims of the United Nations,” it even violates
“moral law.”39 It would be a strange moral law that prohibited the commis-
sion of genocide in some states but not in others. Moreover, like the STL and
the ICTY, the ICJ emphasizes that the obligation to criminalize genocide
does not only apply to states that have freely chosen to ratify the Genocide
Convention, but also binds all states equally as a matter of general interna-
tional law—even those “without any conventional obligation.”40
D. The ILC
The International Law Commission (ILC) has repeatedly affirmed that in-
ternational crimes are criminal no matter where they are committed. The
idea of universality is inherent in the very title of its Draft Codes: “offences
against the peace and security of mankind.”41 It is difficult to see how an act
that is inimical to the peace and security of mankind could be criminal in
some places but not in others—an act either threatens peace and security or
it does not. Indeed, in his Second Report on what would become the 1996
Draft Code, Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam stated that such acts have an
“international dimension” precisely because they “affect peoples, races, na-
tions, cultures, civilizations and mankind” and thus “conflict with universal
values.”42
The universality of international crimes was equally foregrounded in Arti-
cle 19 of the ILC’s 1980 version of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DASR), which defined an “inter-
national crime” as “[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the
38. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opin-
ion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 23 (May 28) (citation omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Second Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by Mr. Doudou
Thiam, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/377 & Corr. 1 (1984), reprinted in [1984] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 89, 89, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 1).
42. Id. at para. 8.
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breach by a state of an international obligation so essential for the protection
of the fundamental interests of the international community that its breach
is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole.”43 That article,
which was based on “the feeling and conviction of the international commu-
nity that certain interests and values are of primordial importance to it,”44
was ultimately put to one side, but not because states took issue with the
idea that international law could universally criminalize certain acts. In-
stead, the ILC concluded that the universalizing position of Article 19
might be better addressed by developing the concepts of jus cogens and obli-
gations erga omnes.45
E. Scholars
ICL scholars have been even more unwavering in their insistence that
international crimes are universally criminal.46 May says “there are some
principles that transcend national borders and achieve universal binding
force. In international law, some crimes so clearly harm the international
community that they must be proscribed in all societies.”47 Cassese makes a
similar claim, arguing that because international crimes involve violations of
rules “intended to protect values considered important by the whole inter-
national community,” they are “consequently binding on all states and indi-
viduals.”48 According to Gaeta, ICL “has its roots in the gradual emergence
of a set of ‘supra-national’ values, proper to the international community as
a whole, that must be safeguarded against those states that—through their
individual organs or their whole apparatus—disregard them.”49 Freeland
likewise emphasizes that the internationalization of justice “recognizes that
43. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, Art.
19(2), UN Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2).
44. Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of “International Crimes” and Its Place in Contemporary International
Law, in International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on
State Responsibility 141, 147 (Joseph H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989).
45. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fiftieth Session, UN Doc. A/53/
10; see also Gennady M. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (1993)
(“The jus cogens concept was regarded by [the ILC] as the best means for reconciling the requirement for
the universality of the offences and of the rule of law with the consensual nature of the proposed interna-
tional instrument whose adoption would require the consent of states.”).
46. The only exceptions are scholars who believe international crimes can be created by treaty. See, e.g.,
O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 56 (arguing that “offences defined by international law which give rise to R
criminal responsibility under municipal law alone” also qualify as international crimes); Steven R.
Ratner et al., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond
the Nuremberg Legacy 12 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing that “a violation of international law becomes an
international crime if the global community intends through any of those strategies (regardless of
whether they are implemented through treaty, custom, or other prescriptive method) to hold individuals
directly responsible for it”).
47. Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account 24 (2005).
48. Antonio Cassese, International Law 436 (2005) (emphasis in original omitted).
49. Paola Gaeta, International Criminal Law, in International Law for International Rela-
tions 259 (Basak Cali ed., 2010).
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there are certain norms of international criminal law that transcend national
boundaries and, like fundamental human rights norms, are regarded as uni-
versal in acceptance and thus should be universal in application.”50 Werle
and Jessberger rely on the “universal nature of international crimes” to ex-
plain why states are permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction over them,51
while Meron reaches the same conclusion based on the fact that international
crimes are “recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern”
and attract “universal condemnation.”52 And both Einarsen and Colangelo
simply refer to international crimes as “universal crimes.”53
Cryer is on firm ground, then, when he claims that “the universal appli-
cability of international criminal law is now a commonplace assumption.”54
Indeed, although it is possible to defend the idea that some international
crimes are not universally criminal,55 it would be surprising if many scholars
took the position that international crimes could be illegal in some places
but not in others. As Koskenniemi says, “it is inherently difficult to accept
the notion that states are legally bound not to engage in genocide, for exam-
ple, only if they have ratified and not formally denounced the 1948 Geno-
cide Convention.”56
This understanding of an international crime, of course, necessarily as-
sumes that international law is capable of deeming certain acts universally
criminal. But how does that happen? How do certain acts become univer-
sally criminal under international law? The direct-criminalization thesis and
the national-criminalization thesis provide very different answers to that
question.
III. THE DIRECT CRIMINALIZATION THESIS
As noted earlier, the DCT defines an international crime as an act that is
directly criminalized by international law itself, irrespective of domestic
criminalization. That thesis finds its seminal expression in the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT):
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
50. Steven Freeland, The Internationalization of Justice—A Case for the Universal Application of Interna-
tional Criminal Law Norms, 4 N.Z. Y.B. Int’l L. 45, 47 (2007). (emphasis in original omitted).
51. Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law 73
(3d ed. 2014).
52. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 554, 570
(1995).
53. See Einarsen, supra note 1, at 6; Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 7 R
Va. J. Int’l L. 149, 160 (2006-2007).
54. Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the Interna-
tional Criminal Law Regime 12 (2005).
55. See, e.g., O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 56 (taking the position that any crime “defined by interna- R
tional law, whether customary or conventional,” qualifies as an international crime).
56. Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1946, 1946 (1990).
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such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. . .
individuals have international duties which transcend the national
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State.57
The basic assumption of the DCT is that there is no relationship between
international criminalization and domestic criminalization: an act can be
criminal under international law even if it is legal under domestic law. That
is what the IMT meant when it said that individuals have “international
duties which transcend. . . national obligations.” Indeed, in the decades
since Nuremberg, the ILC has repeatedly emphasized the irrelevance of do-
mestic criminalization to international criminalization. The 1950 “Princi-
ples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nu¨rnberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal”—the  famous Nuremberg
Principles—provide that “[t]he fact that internal law does not impose a
penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not
relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under interna-
tional law.”58 The 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security
of Mankind affirms that “[t]he characterization of an act or omission as a
crime against the peace and security of mankind is independent of internal
law. The fact that an act or omission is or is not punishable under internal
law does not affect this characterization.”59 And most clearly of all, the 1996
Draft Code states categorically that “[c]rimes against the peace and security
of mankind are crimes under international law and punishable as such,
whether or not they are punishable under national law.”60
The DCT provides a coherent account of how international law could
deem a particular act universally criminal. If international law is superior to
national law—“individuals have international duties which transcend. . .
national obligations”—an act that international law considers criminal
would be criminal even if the territorial state considered it legal. Indeed,
57. IMT, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in 22 The Trial of German Major War Criminals,
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 447
(1946) [hereinafter “IMT Judgment”].
58. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nu¨rnberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle 2 (Aug. 2, 1950), 1950 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, UN Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1950/Add.1.
59. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Text of Draft Articles Provi-
sionally Adopted by the Commission on First Reading, in Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, Art. 2, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459 [and corr.1] and Add.1 at 187
(1991).
60. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, Art. 1(2),
in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996); see also id. at cmt. para. 10 (“The said clause states
that the characterization, or the absence of characterization, of a particular type of behaviour as criminal
under national law has no effect on the characterization of that type of behaviour as criminal under
international law. It is conceivable that a particular type of behaviour characterized as a crime against the
peace and security of mankind in part two might not be prohibited or might even be imposed by
national law.”).
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that act would be criminal even if every state in the world considered it legal,
because rules of international law generally61 apply to all states equally:
The notion of international law itself and of an international com-
munity under the rule of law is based on the assumption—which,
upon analysis, is a statement of fact—that there exist rules and
principles of international law of universal validity binding upon
all subjects of international law, whether States or not, regardless
of their race, religion, geographical situation, political creed, or
degree of civilization.62
The idea of direct criminalization is seductive: it would be nice to believe
that acts like genocide would be universally criminal even if one, 10, or 196
states considered them legal. But how do we know that international crimes
are directly criminalized by international law—as opposed to international
law obligating all states to incorporate those crimes into their domestic law?
There are two possible methodological bases for the DCT: naturalism and
positivism. Neither, unfortunately, is capable of justifying the idea of direct
criminalization.
A. Naturalism
According to Van Schaack, the natural-law tradition “is particularly co-
gent in ICL,” because the field has generally evolved as a reaction to the
commission of mass atrocity, “when a desire to ensure the confluence of law
and morality is likely to be at its strongest.”63 The ILC’s post-Nuremberg
identification of acts that should be considered “crimes against the peace
and security of mankind” is a case in point. As Abi-Saab has noted:
The Rapporteur spe´cial and the ILC were bold enough to admit that
here we have to refer to extra-legal factors; that . . . . [t]hey can
only be identified by reference to the feeling and conviction of the
international community that certain interests and values are of
primordial importance to it, which leads in turn to attaching a
61. The exception—persistent objection—is discussed below.
62. Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law—The General Part, in Collected Papers of
Hersch Lauterpacht 1, 113 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970); see also Robert Y. Jennings, Universal
International Law in a Multicultural World, in Liber Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce
39, 42 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987) (“Nor can there be any question of an area of the globe
where the writ of international law does not run.”); Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from
the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 265, 267 (2009) (“[T]he ‘classic’ understanding of our
notion, universality of international law, means that there exists on the global scale an international law
which is valid for and binding on all states.”); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic of Ger./
Den.; Fed. Republic of Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 39, ¶63 (Feb. 20) (“[C]ustomary law
rules and obligations . . . by their very nature, must have equal force for all members of the international
community.”) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf].
63. Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97
Geo. L.J. 119, 157 (2008).
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special type of legal sanction to the norms intended to protect
them.64
Whatever its merits as an explanation of why states should comply with
international law,65 naturalism cannot provide a convincing defense of the
DCT. To begin with, naturalism is almost by definition incapable of resolv-
ing the many disagreements over which acts qualify as international crimes,
because it cannot adjudicate between competing views by relying on empiri-
cal evidence of what states actually believe66—a limitation that even avowed
naturalists acknowledge.67 As a result, the naturalist identification of inter-
national crimes is either wholly tautological—determining international
crimes by reference to the primordial values of the international community,
and determining the primordial values of the international community by
reference to which acts are internationally criminalized68—or based solely on
criteria that are subjective, contestable, and irremediably political.69 To take
perhaps the most striking example, the ILC’s naturalist criterion for an in-
ternational crime—“an international obligation of essential importance” —
has been denounced by Green as “highly reminiscent of the Hitlerite con-
cept of the ‘fundamental idea of law and sound fundamental popular feel-
ing’.”70 Nor has naturalism in general fared any better. Cryer, for example,
has argued that its vagueness and subjectivity “violate the nullum crimen
principle”71 and open the door to neo-colonialism—naturalism’s “fellow
64. Abi-Saab, supra note 44, at 147. R
65. See generally Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural. Law, International Order and the Limits of
Legal Positivism, 12 Eur. J. Int’l L. 269-307 (2001) (arguing that naturalism provides the only coherent
explanation of why international law is obligatory).
66. See, e.g., Jo¨rg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary Interna-
tional Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 523, 543 (2004) (“While the result of the
deduction might or might not correspond to positive norms, a pure deduction will not establish any
signs for human-willed activity and thus this approach cannot give much insight into a positive legal
order like international law.”); Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia 308 (2006) (“Natu-
ralism needs positivism to manifest its content in an objective fashion. ‘‘Justice’’, ‘‘common interest’’ or
‘‘reasonableness’’ seem to be arguable in a tangible way only by linking them to what States have
thought them to mean—to what they have consented to.”).
67. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 65, at 306 (“The natural law is not a vehicle . . . for providing detailed R
and prescriptive answers to the numerous problems of international life. It provides us merely with a
coherent framework within which we are free to fashion just solutions within very broadly set limits.”).
68. See O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 59-60. R
69. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 56, at 1947 (noting that naturalist argument is “not open to a R
modern lawyer or court, much less an international court, established for the settlement of disputes
between varying cultures, varying traditions, and varying conceptions of reason and justice,” because
“[s]uch conceptions seem to be historically and contextually conditioned, so that imposing them on a
nonconsenting state seems both political and unjustifiable as such”).
70. Leslie C. Green, New Trends in International Criminal Law, 11 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 9, 29 (1981);
see also Manfred Mohr, The ILC’s Distinction Between “International Crimes” and “International Delicts” and its
Implications, in United Nations Codification of State Responsibility 123 (Marina Spinedi &
Bruno Simma eds., 1987) (criticizing the criterion for leaving “too much room for (conflicting) interpre-
tation and subjectivism”); Jean Allain, A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 100, 102 (1997) (describing the criterion as
“pure innovation”).
71. Cryer, Doctrinal, supra note 8, at 127. R
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traveler.”72 Relying on naturalism to determine the central concept of
ICL—what qualifies as an international crime—is thus antithetical to ICL’s
legitimacy.73
Even more fundamentally, naturalism is incapable of explaining why acts
that qualify as international crimes are directly criminalized by international
law—the defining characteristic of the DCT. Even if we accept that interna-
tional crimes are acts that contravene “principles of justice which [have] a
universal and eternal validity,” there is no a priori reason why their universal
criminality has to be ensured by direct criminalization, instead of by a uni-
versal obligation on states not to tolerate the offending conduct.74 Indeed, as
we will see, Grotius’s naturalist understanding of international criminality
depends precisely on the existence of such an obligation.
B. Positivism
At first glance, positivism provides a much more plausible basis for the
DCT. The fundamental problem with naturalism is its indeterminacy—its
lack of a concrete method for determining the specific rules of international
law. Positivism may be more art than science,75 but it at least has the merit
of deriving international legal rules inductively, on the basis of how states
act, instead of deductively, on the basis of supposedly universal values. So
just as there is no a priori reason why naturalism can establish the existence
of direct criminalization by international law, there is no a priori reason why
positivism cannot.76 Because “international law is what states make it, and
they can make it bind individuals directly,”77 the only relevant question is
whether the DCT is supported by the formal sources of international law.
As noted earlier, every international tribunal has claimed a strict fidelity
to positivism—as have most ICL scholars,78 even those, such as Bassiouni,79
72. Id. at 113.
73. Id.
74. Akehurst, supra note 12, at 15. See, e.g., Win-Chiat Lee, International Crimes and Universal Juris- R
diction, in International Criminal Law and Philosophy 15, 20 (Larry May & Zachary Hoskins eds.,
2010) (“More important, even if we do invoke natural law, the claim that certain acts are simply wrong
by nature and therefore ought to be suppressed universally does not, by itself, explain the idea that these
acts should be criminalized internationally as a matter of principle. This claim could very well lead to the
conclusion that each and every state has a duty to criminalize these acts within their municipal law”).
75. See generally David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 Am. Univ. Int’l L. Rev. 1 (1987).
76. See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 Curr. Legal Probs.
263, 276 (1950) (“Whether any subjects or objects of international law are the addressees of rules of
international criminal law depends on a very simple criterion: the evidence introduced by those who
assert the existence of an international criminal law.”).
77. O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 83. R
78. See, e.g., Farhad Malekian, I International Criminal Law 23 (1991) (“[T]he only acceptable
method for identifying the existence of an international crime is the adoption of certain international
rules by a custom, by any norm or by a conventional rule in the practice of nations through consensus.”).
79. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 Case
W. Res. J. Int’l L. 27, 28 (1983) (“The only basis which now exists [for international crimes] is
empirical or experiential; conventional and customary international law implicitly or explicitly establish
that a given act is part of international criminal law.”).
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who promote a particularly expansive version of ICL. It is thus surprising
that, with the exception of a moderately-skeptical O’Keefe,80 no scholar has
attempted a serious positivist defense of direct criminalization. Instead, they
have generally focused on using positivism to defend the idea of individual
criminal responsibility under international law. As discussed above, how-
ever, there is no necessary connection between the international criminality
of a particular act and its direct criminalization. So the question remains: is
the idea of direct criminalization positivistically defensible? Or does the
DCT require recourse to naturalism, with all its attendant problems?
To begin with, it is important to recognize that we are really asking
whether the direct criminalization of international crimes qualifies as a rule
of general international law. Substantive obligations contained in multilat-
eral treaties apply only to state parties; they do not apply to non-parties. So
although a treaty that affirms direct criminalization of a particular act could
contribute to the creation of a parallel customary rule that applied to all
states equally,81 as a matter of conventional law only a universally ratified
treaty affirming direct criminalization could satisfy the DCT’s universality
requirement. To date, no such treaty exists.82
It is an open question, however, whether the DCT can be satisfied by an
“ordinary” rule of custom that establishes the direct criminalization of in-
ternational crimes. The problem is the doctrine of persistent objection,
which permits a state to “opt out” of a rule that is crystallizing but has not
yet achieved customary status.83 If persistent objection is possible in ICL,
states were free to persistently object to the direct criminalization of the core
international crimes84 and remain free to persistently object to the direct
criminalization of new ones. The possibility of persistent objection, however,
means that the universal criminality of international crimes can, in fact, be
limited by domestic law—which is precisely what the DCT prohibits.
Proponents of the DCT are thus faced with a choice: either reject the idea
of persistent objection or argue that the direct criminalization of interna-
tional crimes is jus cogens, making persistent objection to direct criminaliza-
tion impossible.85 The first option is obviously more desirable, because it is
far more difficult to prove the existence of a jus cogens norm than it is to
80. See O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 73. R
81. See Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 31 (Ian Brownlie & James Craw-
ford eds., 8th ed. 2012).
82. As discussed below, the Geneva Conventions—the only universally-ratified treaties that affect
ICL—function as suppression conventions.
83. See, e.g., ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 27. R
84. It is an open question whether any state did, with the possible exception of aggression. See Ken-
neth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal Courts, 48
Vill. L. Rev. 763, 834 (2003) (“In general, there has not been persistent objection by States to the
creation of customary norms forbidding genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”).
85. See, e.g., ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 10 (rejecting persistent objection to jus cogens R
norms); Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent Objector Revisited, 59 ICLQ
779, 798-99 (2010) (same).
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prove an ordinary customary rule.86 The problem is that, despite a few schol-
arly dissenters,87 the possibility of persistent objection is generally accepted.
Crawford, for example, states that “[w]hatever the theoretical underpinnings
of the persistent objector principle, it is recognized by international tribu-
nals, and in the practice of states.”88 Similarly, the International Law Associ-
ation’s Final Report on Custom acknowledges that “[i]f whilst a practice is
developing into a rule of general law, a State persistently and openly dissents
from the rule, it will not be bound by it.”89
Because of persistent objection, DCT proponents likely need to argue that
the direct criminalization of international crimes is jus cogens. To date, no
ICL scholar has specifically made that claim – although many scholars,90 as
well as the ILC’s Working Group on the Obligation to Extradite or Prose-
cute,91 take the position that the international crimes are jus cogens them-
selves. The two arguments, however, are not coterminous: the obligation to
avoid committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide might
rise to the level of universal international law without international law di-
rectly criminalizing those acts. It is equally possible—and more positivisti-
cally defensible, as explained in the next Part—that the jus cogens status of
the international crimes could impose an obligation on all states to incorpo-
rate international crimes into their domestic law. That does not mean, of
course, that direct criminalization cannot be jus cogens. But it does mean that
whether direct criminalization is jus cogens is a different inquiry than
whether international crimes are, requiring different state practice and opinio
juris.92
It is exceedingly unlikely that state practice and opinio juris establish that
direct criminalization of international crimes is a jus cogens norm. In fact, as
86. See, e.g., Erika De Wet, Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in The Oxford Handbook of
International Human Rights Law 542 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013) (noting that Art. 53 VCLT’s
reference to “the international community as a whole” implies that “a particular norm is first recognized
as customary international law, whereafter the international community of states as a whole further
agrees that it is a norm from which no derogation is permitted. The international community of states as
a whole would therefore subject a peremptory norm to ‘double acceptance’).
87. See, e.g., Dumberry, supra note 85, at 780 (“Our survey will show that there is only very weak R
judicial recognition of the theory of persistent objector and that there is no actual State practice support-
ing it.”).
88. Brownlie’s Public International Law, supra note 81, at 28. R
89. ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 27. R
90. See, e.g., Allain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 4 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L.
315, 318 (1997-1998) (“I . . . urge that it would be easier and more convenient to define an international
crime as a breach of a norm of jus cogens.”); May, supra note 47, at 25 (“Jus cogens norms—literally the R
laws or norms that are known and binding throughout humanity—form the clearest basis for identifying
distinctly international crimes as violations of international law.”).
91. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, 65th Session of the International Law Commission, Informal Working
Paper of the Working Group on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute, ¶ 189, UN Doc. ILC(LXV)/WG/OEP/
INFORMAL/1 (April 5, 2013) (noting that “the core crimes under international law [are] proscribed by
jus cogens”) [hereinafter “ILC Extradite or Prosecute Paper”].
92. In a similar fashion, the ILC insists that it is not possible to assume that states have a customary
obligation to extradite or prosecute individuals suspected of international crimes simply because the
crimes themselves are jus cogens. See generally id.
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the following discussion shows, direct criminalization does not even qualify
as an ordinary rule of custom. “To determine the existence and content of a
rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there
is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).”93 To qualify as
“general,” state practice “must be sufficiently widespread and representa-
tive, as well as consistent.”94 Such practice normally accretes slowly, but
there is no minimum amount of time required.95 Many different kinds of
action qualify as state practice, including both physical acts and verbal
acts.96 No matter what form practice takes, however, the requirement of
opinio juris “means that the practice in question must be undertaken with a
sense of legal right or obligation.”97
With those basic principles in mind, this Article turns to five types of
evidence that could support the customary status of direct criminalization.
1. Ratification of Multilateral Treaties
The first potential source of state practice and opinio juris is the ratifica-
tion of multilateral treaties that affirm the direct criminalization of certain
acts. A treaty can contribute to the formation of a customary rule, as long as
it is widely ratified and intended to have a law-making effect:
“[L]aw-making treaties” . . . are intended to have an effect gener-
ally, not restrictively, and they are to be contrasted with those
treaties which merely regulate limited issues between a few states.
Law-making treaties are those agreements whereby states elabo-
rate their perception of international law upon any given topic or
establish new rules which are to guide them for the future in their
international conduct. Such lawmaking treaties, of necessity, re-
quire the participation of a large number of states to emphasise
this effect, and may produce rules that will bind all. They consti-
tute normative treaties, agreements that prescribe rules of conduct
to be followed.98
93. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 1. R
94. Id. at 3; see also ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 20. R
95. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 3; see also ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 20. R
96. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 2; see also ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 14. R
97. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 3. R
98. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 95 (6th ed. 2008); see also Brownlie’s Public In-
ternational Law, supra note 81, at 31 (“Although treaties are as such binding only on the parties, the R
number of parties, the explicit acceptance of these rules by states generally and, in some cases, the
declaratory character of the provisions combine to produce a powerful law-creating effect.”); Robert
Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars, and the Gavel: The Influence of International Criminal Tribunals on the
ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. Confl. & Sec. L. 239, 244 (2006) (noting, with regard to multilateral
treaties, that “a very widely ratified treaty has a considerable ‘pull’ towards acceptance, as there is a
feeling that if a treaty is very broadly ratified, it represents the general expectations of those states”);
R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 275,
278 (1965-1966) (“Having regard to the limited amount of State practice which is generally regarded as
sufficient to establish the existence of a rule in customary international law, a treaty to which a substan-
tial number of States are parties must be counted as extremely powerful evidence of the law.”).
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Indeed, the ICJ has suggested that a law-making treaty with “very wide-
spread and representative participation,” particularly by specially-affected
states, might by itself be sufficient to create customary international law.99 It
is not surprising, therefore, that scholars have pointed to multilateral trea-
ties as evidence that international crimes are prohibited by customary as
well as by conventional law.100
Even if multilateral treaties can contribute to the formation of custom or
create custom by themselves—the latter idea being very controversial, hav-
ing been generally rejected by the International Law Association (ILA)101—
ICL treaties provide very little support for the idea that the core interna-
tional crimes are directly criminalized by international law. The following
analysis begins by discussing international treaties and conventions that ad-
dress specific core international crimes. It then examines the two treaties
that established international criminal tribunals: the London Charter and
the Rome Statute.
a. War Crimes
War-crimes treaties provide almost no support for the DCT. The univer-
sally-ratified Geneva Conventions do not declare that war crimes are “crimes
under international law”; they do not even qualify grave breaches as “crimes
of a truly international character.”102 They are simply suppression conven-
tions that require states to domestically criminalize the grave breaches.103
The First Additional Protocol describes grave breaches as “war crimes,”104
but says nothing about direct criminalization, choosing instead to apply the
state-centered suppression regime established by the Geneva Conventions.105
And the Second Additional Protocol does not even contemplate criminal
responsibility for violations of IHL in non-international armed conflict.106
The only multilateral war-crimes treaties that potentially support the
DCT, therefore, are the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity107 and the Rome
99. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 62, at 43. R
100. Bassiouni, Penal Characteristics, supra note 79, at 29 (“[A]n international crime is any conduct R
which is designated as a crime in a multilateral convention recognized by a significant number of
states.”).
101. See ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 54 (“[A] single plurilateral or bilateral treaty cannot R
instantly create general customary law ‘of its own impact’, and it seems improbable that even a series of
such treaties will produce such an effect, save in (at most) the rarest of circumstances.”).
102. See Simma & Paulus, supra note 10, at 311. R
103. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention
IV), art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).
104. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 85(5), Jun. 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (June 8, 1977).
105. Id., art. 86.
106. See Simma & Paulus, supra note 10, at 311. R
107. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
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Statute.108 The Rome Statute is addressed separately below. As for the Stat-
ute of Limitations Convention, although it deems war crimes to be “among
the gravest crimes in international law,”109 it does not specifically affirm
their direct criminalization—which it does for crimes against humanity and
genocide.
b. Crimes Against Humanity
Other than the London Charter and the Rome Statute, only two treaties
address crimes against humanity: the Statute of Limitations Convention and
the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid.110 The text of the Statute of Limitations Convention
clearly supports the DCT, because it specifically prohibits applying statutes
of limitations to crimes against humanity (and genocide) “even if such acts
do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which
they were committed.”111 The Convention, however, has not proven popular
with states: despite having been open for signature for nearly five decades,
only 55 states have ratified it.112 The Convention thus provides little sup-
port for a customary rule of direct criminalization.
The Apartheid Convention, which deems apartheid a crime against hu-
manity,113 also provides little support for the DCT. Although the Conven-
tion provides that there is “international criminal responsibility” for acts of
apartheid,114 the Convention functions as a suppression convention,115 with
Article IV requiring state parties to criminalize apartheid domestically and
exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime.116 Moreover, even if the
Apartheid Convention did support the DCT, it has been ratified by only
55% of the world’s states—109—and those ratifications are anything but
“widespread” and “representative,” given that “no western power has ac-
cepted it . . . [and] among the ‘Great Powers’ the Soviet Union is the only
one to have done so.”117
108. The London Charter deemed war crimes “crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal.” Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 280. The Charter is discussed below.
109. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations, pmbl., para. 5, Nov. 26, 1968,
754 U.N.T.S. 73.
110. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Jul.
18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
111. Statute of Limitations Convention, supra note 109, art. 1(b). R
112. International Committee of the Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, Conven-
tion on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/435?OpenDocument.
113. Apartheid Convention, supra note 110, art. 1. R
114. Id., art. 3.
115. See, e.g., Gaeta, supra note 49, at 64. R
116. Apartheid Convention, supra note 110, art. 4. R
117. L. C. Green, International Crimes and the Legal Process, 29 Int’l L. Comp. Q. 567, 579 (1980).
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c. Genocide
At first glance, the Genocide Convention appears to provide strong sup-
port for the DCT. The Convention specifically refers to genocide as “a crime
under international law,”118 which indicates that it has a law-making qual-
ity.119 Moreover, the Genocide Convention has gained far more international
acceptance than the Statute of Limitations Convention or the Apartheid
Convention, with 147 states parties—76% of the world’s states.120
Looks, however, can be deceiving. It is ahistorical to assume that the Ge-
nocide Convention’s reference to genocide as a “crime under international
law” was designed to affirm direct criminalization. On the contrary, as
Kunz noted in 1949, the drafters had no such intention:
The Convention is entirely different from the law of the Nurem-
berg Trial and does not create at all an international criminal law
nor international criminal courts . . . . The Convention does not
make individuals subjects of international law, nor of interna-
tional duties or international rights; it is, in this respect, a thor-
oughly old-fashioned, traditional treaty . . . . Under Article I it is
the states which recognize that genocide is a crime under interna-
tional law which they—not international law—undertake to pre-
vent and punish.121
Put more simply, the Genocide Convention was a forerunner of the modern
suppression convention, relying on the goodwill of states to achieve the uni-
versal criminalization of genocide.122 Indeed, although this has also been
generally forgotten, even the Convention’s much-hallowed reference to the
possibility of an “international penal tribunal” emphasized that the author-
ity of any such tribunal would be based on states freely accepting its juris-
diction.123 The Genocide Convention’s widespread ratification thus does not
help establish the customary status of direct criminalization. Instead, it con-
tributes to a customary obligation on states to criminalize genocide domesti-
cally—the hallmark of the NCT.
118. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
119. Crawford specifically cites the Genocide Convention as an example of a law-making treaty. See
Brownlie’s Public International Law, supra note 81, at 31. R
120. For a list of states that have ratified the Genocide Convention, see U.N., Status of Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en.
121. Josef L. Kunz, The Genocide Convention, 43 Am. J. Int’l L. 732, 744 (1949).
122. Gaeta, supra note 49, at 67 (“This Convention. . .applied the traditional scheme of repression, by R
requesting contracting states to criminalize genocide within its legal orders.”).
123. Genocide Convention, supra note 118, art. 6 (“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other R
acts enumerated in article III shall be tried. . .by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdic-
tion with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”).
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d. Aggression
The London Charter and the Rome Statute are the only treaties that ad-
dress the crime of aggression. They are discussed below.
e. The London Charter
There is one reference to direct criminalization in the London Charter:
Art. 6(c), which deemed crimes against humanity punishable “whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”124
The ILC repeated that expression almost verbatim in Art. 1(2) of the 1996
Draft Code, which explicitly affirms the DCT.125
The London Charter supports the DCT, however, only if the drafters ei-
ther believed that the Charter reflected customary international law or at
least intended the Charter to establish new rules that would subsequently
bind all states. With regard to the first interpretation, the Charter itself is
equivocal: although Art 6(c) refers to the irrelevance of domestic law, the
text of the Charter does not refer even once to “international law” and de-
scribes war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression as “crimes com-
ing within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,” not as “crimes under
international law.”126 The drafting history also fails to provide a definitive
answer, although it is difficult to argue that all four Allies believed that the
Charter was an expression of customary international law as it stood prior to
the war. During the London Conference, for example, Professor Andre Gros,
a member of the French delegation, objected that the crimes contained in
the Charter were nothing more than the “creation of four people who are
just four individuals,” because “[t]hose acts have been known for years
before and have not been declared criminal violations of international
law.”127 Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, the British delegate—and subsequently
the British prosecutor at the IMT—later responded that “[w]hat we want to
abolish at the trial is a discussion as to whether the acts are violations of
international law or not. We declare what international law is . . . there
won’t be any discussion of whether it is international law or not.”128
Despite Fyfe’s reference to the Allies enunciating international law, the
second interpretation of the Charter—that it declared international law but
did not necessarily reflect it—is also questionable. Most notably, the UN
Secretary-General rejected that position in his 1949 report on the IMT. In
his view, because “[t]he London Agreement and the Charter annexed to it
provide for the trial by a special tribunal (or eventually several special tribu-
nals) of a group of well-defined cases,” they appear to be “a lex in casu to be
124. London Charter, supra note 108, art. 6(c). R
125. Supra note 60.
126. Id.
127. Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty-Five Years Later, in Perspectives on the Nuremberg
Trial 510 (Gue´nae¨l Mettraux ed., 2008).
128. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\58-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-FEB-18 9:00
374 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 58
applied by an ad hoc tribunal to a special case or group of cases.”129 Scholars
writing at the time also generally took the position that the Charter was law
solely for the Nazi defendants. Kunz, for example, described the Charter as
“only a lex specialis against a named group of men in the service of a con-
quered enemy.”130 Kelsen agreed, writing that “[t]he source of law is the
London Agreement; and it is a source of law only and exclusively for the
International Military Tribunal established by this Agreement.”131 As a re-
sult, even if the Charter affirmed direct criminalization, it provides neither
state practice nor opinio juris in favor of the DCT.132
The Tribunal itself, of course, viewed the London Charter quite differ-
ently—as both reflecting and declaring international law. “The Charter is
not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations,” the
judges wrote, but “the expression of International Law existing at the time
of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to International
Law.”133 The judgment also explicitly affirmed the idea of direct criminal-
ization—“individuals have international duties which transcend the na-
tional obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.”
The Nuremberg judgment nevertheless provides little support for the
DCT. To begin with, the judgment itself represents neither state practice
nor opinio juris in favor of direct criminalization, because the decisions of
international tribunals are simply subsidiary means for determining the pri-
mary rules of international law.134 Moreover, and more fundamentally, the
judgment is a particularly unconvincing subsidiary means. Not only was the
IMT almost certainly wrong concerning the legal status of the London Char-
ter—for the reasons discussed above—it is difficult to argue that interna-
tional law directly criminalized war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
acts of aggression prior to the IMT itself.135 As O’Keefe charitably puts it,
the Tribunal’s claim that “individuals can be punished for violations of in-
129. The Charter and Judgment of the Nu¨rnberg Tribunal: History and Analysis, Memorandum
Submitted by the Secretary-General 37, UN Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949).
130. Kunz, supra note 121, at 742. R
131. Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?,
in Mettraux, supra note 127, at 282. R
132. See Kress, ICL, supra note 10, at 23 (“From an institutional perspective, it is difficult to portray R
these tribunals as organs of the international community and as a first instance of a direct enforcement of
international criminal law.”).
133. IMT Judgment, supra note 57, at 444; see also UNSG Nuremberg Report, supra note 129, at 38 R
(“The Court thus considerably widened the scope of the Charter and, at the same time, of its own
findings. It affirmed the validity of the Charter not only as a lex in casu, as the law of the case which it
had been set to judge, but also as an authoritative expression of general international law.”).
134. See ICRC, I Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rules xxxiv (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 4; cf. Georg R
Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, in Mettraux, supra note 127, at 176 (“The Judgment is a R
contribution to international law to the extent to which . . . the Tribunal has made itself an instrument
for declaring pre-existing law.”).
135. See, e.g., O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 73 (“[S]erious doubts existed as to whether the concepts of R
crimes against humanity and crimes against peace really did reflect customary international law as it
stood at the time of commission.”).
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ternational law masked a lack of clarity as to the precise juridical basis for
this statement.”136
f. The Rome Statute
Although the precise relationship between the Rome Statute and custom-
ary international law is much debated,137 nearly all scholars agree that the
definitions of crimes were generally intended to reflect custom.138 There is
no question, therefore, that the Rome Statute’s 125 ratifications help con-
firm the customary status of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
and (perhaps) aggression.
The Rome Statute provides no support, however, for the idea that the core
international crimes are directly criminalized by international law. The text
of the treaty does not affirm direct criminalization; it does not even use the
expression “crime under international law.”139 More importantly, the Rome
Statute consistently foregrounds the importance of domestic criminalization
of international crimes. The Preamble, for example, recalls “that it is the
duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes”140 and emphasizes that the ICC “shall be comple-
mentary to national criminal jurisdictions.”141 More importantly, because
the Court is based on the delegated jurisdiction of its member states,142 its
ability to prosecute an international crime always depends—at least in the
absence of a Security Council referral, whose legislative authority is dis-
cussed below—on the consent of either the territorial state or the state of
active nationality.143 Such dependence is the antithesis of the DCT, which is
predicated on the idea that international crimes can be prosecuted even in
the absence of state consent.
136. Id.
137. See Leila Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between the Two: Article
10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 909, 911-17 (1999-2000).
138. See, e.g., Philip Kirsch, Foreword, in Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes under the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court xiii (2003) (noting that there was ‘general
agreement that the definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute were to reflect existing customary interna-
tional law, and not to create new law”); see also Darryl Robinson & Herman von Hebel, War Crimes in
Internal Conflicts: Art. 8 of the ICC Statute, 2 Y.B. of Int’l Human. L. 193, 194 (1999) (same).
139. Instead, the Rome Statute describes the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as the “most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” See Rome Statute, supra note 35, R
Preamble, para. 4.
140. Id., para. 6.
141. Id., para. 10.
142. See, e.g., Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdic-
tion: A Close Encounter?, 56 ICLQ 49, 50-51 (2009) (“The ICC operates on the basis of delegated jurisdic-
tion from its States parties.”); Hans Peter Kaul & Claus Kress, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of
the International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises, 2 Y.B. Int’l Human. L. 143, 145 (1999)
(noting that the Rome Statute is based on “the very simple idea that states must be entitled to do
collectively what they have the power to do individually”).
143. Expressed, of course, by the decision to ratify or accede to the Rome Statute – automatic
jurisdiction.
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2. Domestic Incorporation and National Prosecution
A second potential source of evidence for the DCT would be the incorpo-
ration of international crimes into domestic law and the prosecution of in-
ternational crimes in national courts. Both count as state practice for
purposes of establishing customary international law.144 Many states domes-
tically criminalize international crimes—as of 2011, more than 140
criminalized at least one war crime, more than 90 criminalized at least one
crime against humanity, and more than 115 criminalized genocide.145 Na-
tional prosecutions of international crimes have also become increasingly
commonplace.
Domestic legislation and national prosecutions clearly help establish the
customary status of individual criminal responsibility for international
crimes.146 But it is difficult to see how they could support the idea of direct
criminalization. States overwhelmingly criminalize and prosecute interna-
tional crimes because they have ratified a treaty (most often, the Geneva
Conventions or the Genocide Convention) that requires them to do so. Such
indirect enforcement of international criminal law may well contribute to a
customary obligation on all states to criminalize and prosecute international
crimes, but almost by definition it cannot contribute to a customary rule
that says certain acts are directly criminalized by international law regardless
of domestic criminalization. Domestic criminalization and prosecution
would thus favor the NCT instead of the DCT, given that the hallmark of
the NCT is the existence of a universal obligation to criminalize.
It is possible, of course, that some states criminalize and prosecute inter-
national crimes because of a perceived need to enforce international law’s
direct criminalization of certain acts. Crimes against humanity would be the
most promising candidate, given that at least 90 states have incorporated at
least one crime against humanity into their domestic criminal law147 even
though only apartheid is addressed by a suppression convention. Other ex-
planations, however, are equally if not more likely. Such incorporation could
reflect the growing belief that customary international law imposes an obli-
gation on states to either extradite or punish (aut dedere aut judicare) individ-
uals suspected of committing core international crimes148—an explanation
144. See, e.g., ILA, Custom Report, supra note 15, at 18. R
145. See Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 12–13. R
146. See, e.g., Simma & Paulus, supra note 10, at 309 (“To anchor individual responsibility for geno- R
cide in customary law, there must be practice and opinio juris. International practice on the prosecution
of perpetrators can be found in both domestic and international trials of offenders.”).
147. Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 13. R
148. See, e.g., Christian J. Tams, Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible
State?, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1161, 1174 (2002) (arguing, with regard to core international crimes, that
“recent developments in international law would indeed point towards the growing acceptance of an
obligation to prosecute”); cf. ILC Extradite or Prosecute Paper, supra note 91, ¶ 189 (concluding that R
“the obligation aut dedere aut judicare has crystallized or at least is in the process of crystallizing into a
rule of customary international law,” especially “in the case of core crimes under international law pro-
scribed by jus cogens”).
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that favors the NCT over the DCT. Or it could simply be a way for states to
ensure that their nationals are never prosecuted by the ICC. Van Steen-
berghe identifies five states—Argentina, Panama, Peru, Portugal, and Uru-
guay—that have incorporated international crimes for precisely that
reason,149 and the number is likely much higher, given how many states did
not incorporate international crimes until they ratified the Rome Statute.150
In any case, the ambiguity inherent in domestic incorporation means that
incorporation does not support direct criminalization. As the ILA has
pointed out, ambiguous conduct counts as state practice only if it is accom-
panied by unambiguous opinio juris, whether express or implied.151
3. General Assembly Resolutions
A third potential source of evidence for the DCT would be resolutions
adopted by the UN General Assembly. Resolutions of international organi-
zations qualify as both state practice152 and opinio juris,153 and “[w]here the
vast majority of states consistently vote for resolutions and declarations on a
topic. . . a binding rule may very well emerge provided that the requisite
opinio juris can be proved.”154 It is an open question, however, whether
General Assembly resolutions are capable of establishing new rules of cus-
tomary international law even without accompanying state practice—so-
called “instant custom.” The ILA takes the position that “[r]esolutions ac-
cepted unanimously or almost unanimously, and which evince a clear inten-
tion on the part of their supporters to lay down a rule of international law,
are capable, very exceptionally, of creating general customary law by the
mere fact of their adoption.”155 Some scholars agree, most notably Bin
Cheng.156 The ILC, however, rejects the idea of instant custom, insisting
that “[a] resolution adopted by an international organization or at an inter-
governmental conference cannot, of itself, create a rule of customary interna-
tional law.”157 Many scholars are also skeptical158—and the idea of instant
149. Raphael van Steenberghe, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute: Clarifying its Nature, 9 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 1089, 1097 (2011).
150. Bangladesh, Burkina-Faso, Comoros, Congo, Cyprus, Latvia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands,
Republic of Korea, Samoa, South Africa, Spain. See Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 29-106. R
Some of those states might have incorporated international crimes because they believe – wrongly – that
the Rome Statute requires incorporation. Samoa appears to be in that category. See Appendix.
151. ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 38. R
152. See, e.g., ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 2; ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 19. R
153. See, e.g., ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 3; ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 55-56. R
154. Shaw, supra note 98, at 115; see also Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contempo- R
rary Principles and Perspectives 87 (2012) (“The value of opinio juris in General Assembly resolu-
tions . . . depends on the degree of consensus achieved by particular resolutions, as well as the number of
times the norm has been reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions.”).
155. ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 61. R
156. Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law 138 (1997) (“Not only is it unnecessary
that the usage should be prolonged, but there need also be no usage at all in the sense of repeated
practice, provided that the opinio juris of the States concerned can be clearly established. Consequently,
international customary law has in reality only one constitutive element, the opinio juris.”).
157. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 4. R
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custom seems difficult to reconcile with ICJ jurisprudence.159 In the Nicara-
gua case, for example, the Court stated unequivocally that “[t]he mere fact
that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for the
Court to consider these as being part of customary international law.”160
Even if we accept instant custom, however, General Assembly resolutions
concerning the core international crimes provide little support for the idea
of direct criminalization.
a. Res. 95(I)
The most important General Assembly resolution is the unanimously
adopted Res. 95(I), which “[a]ffirm[ed] the principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgment of
the Tribunal.”161 Scholars have routinely relied on Res. 95(I) to affirm the
customary status of the Nuremberg Principles. Green, for example, claims
that, “[b]y virtue of their acceptance” of the Resolution, “the members of
the United Nations have accepted that those principles, including that
which affirms the criminality of aggressive war, are declaratory of the cus-
tomary law regarding crimes against the law of armed conflict.”162 Courts
have done likewise, as illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights’
statement in Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia that “the universal validity of the
principles concerning crimes against humanity was subsequently confirmed
by . . . resolution 95 of the United Nations General Assembly . . . .”163
This understanding of Res. 95(I), however, is ahistorical. There is no
question that the UN and many states hoped the General Assembly would
draft and adopt a resolution that declared the Nuremberg Principles to be
part of customary international law; after all, the Secretary-General told the
Assembly during the second day of its first session—a mere three weeks
after the IMT judgment had been delivered—that it would be of “decisive
158. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 12, at 46 (“[T]he very notion of ‘custom’ implies some time R
element and ‘instant custom’ is a contradiction in terms.”); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of
International Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Aust. Y.B. Int’l L. 82, 89-
90 (1988-1989) (describing the idea of instant custom as “new, radical” and representing a “dubious
metamorphosis” in the idea of state practice); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the UN
General Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 301, 302 (1979) (“General
Assembly resolutions are neither legislative nor sufficient to create custom, not only because the General
Assembly is not authorized to legislate.”).
159. See Akehurst, supra note 12, at 46. R
160. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, 97 (June 27).
161. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, GA Res. 95(I), UN Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946).
162. L.C. Green, Is There an International Criminal Law?, 21 Alta. L. Rev. 251, 255 (1983); see also
O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 73 (arguing with regard to the Nuremberg Principles that the adoption of Res. R
95(I) “settl[ed], at a formal level, debate over the principles’ claims to the status of positive international
law”); Bassiouni, Ratione Personae, supra note 5, at 76 (claiming that the Resolution is “considered declar- R
ative of customary international law”).
163. Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, Decision as to Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72404#{“itemid”:[“001-72404”]}.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\58-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 27 14-FEB-18 9:00
2017 / Heller – International Crime 379
significance to have the principles which were implied in the Nurnberg tri-
als . . . made a permanent part of the body of international law as quickly as
possible.”164 But those hopes were never realized, because states simply
could not agree that the Nuremberg Principles should apply to all states
equally. Bin Cheng—the same Bin Cheng who is widely considered the
progenitor of instant custom—made that point forcefully in 1965:
[I]n order to speak of a law-finding resolution, there must have
existed, first of all, the necessary opinio juris communis among
Members of the United Nations that what they are enunciating in
the resolution represents binding rules of international law. Sec-
ondly, the wording of the resolution must not merely identify
clearly the contents of the rules in question, but must also un-
equivocally express this opinio juris communis . . . The same cannot,
however, be said of the Assembly resolution 95 (I) “affirming”
the so-called “principles of international law recognised by “the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal”; for there the Assembly de-
liberately and rather subtly declined to use either the word “reaf-
firm” as found in the original United States proposal or the word
“confirm”, thus indicating clearly a lack of consensus among
United Nations Members as to the binding character of the Nu-
remberg principles as rules of general international law.165
Bin Cheng’s emphasis on the need for clarity concerning the principles
declared to represent customary international law is particularly important,
because Res. 95(I) only called upon the Committee on Progressive Develop-
ment (CPD)166 to make plans to formulate the Nuremberg Principles; the
General Assembly made no attempt to articulate those Principles itself.167
Indeed, the Cuban delegate refused to accept the Resolution precisely be-
cause “it affirmed the principles of international law without developing
them.”168 Res. 95(I) is thus a striking example of a General Assembly reso-
lution that, to quote the ILA, is “so devoid, or almost devoid, of legally
definable content” that it cannot meaningfully contribute to the formation
of custom.169
The Nuremberg Principles fared no better in the CPD. The drafting Sub-
Committee initially proposed to instruct the ILC to prepare “a draft conven-
tion incorporating the principles of international law as recognized by the
Statute of the Tribunal of Nurnberg and sanctioned by the judgment of that
164. UNSG Nuremberg Report, supra note 129, at 11. R
165. Bin Cheng, supra note 156, at 141. R
166. Referred to in Res. 95(I) as the “Committee on the codification of international law.” Res. 95(1)
supra note 156, ¶ 4.
167. See Res. 95(I), supra note 161, ¶ 2. R
168. Quoted in UNSG Nuremberg Report, supra note 129, at 13. R
169. ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 62. R
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Tribunal, in order to give to these principles a binding force for all.”170 As
the Secretary-General noted in his report on the IMT, however, that univer-
salizing language proved too ambitious for most states to accept:
When the Committee considered the report of the drafting Sub-
Committee, the representative of Yugoslavia moved to delete the
words “binding force for all” and replace them by “binding force
for the signatory States” on the ground that conventions could
only bind the signatory States. The representative of France
agreed with the point of view of the Yugoslav representative and
suggested to delete the last part of the sentence altogether begin-
ning from the words “in order to,” etc. This suggestion was sup-
ported by the representative of the Soviet Union and approved by
the Committee.171
The CPD’s position was thus clear: states would be free to accept or reject
the Nuremberg Principles (when formulated by the ILC) as they saw fit,
because the Principles did not represent customary international law.
b. Res. 96(I)
In contrast to Res. 95(I), Bin Cheng specifically cited Res. 96(I), which
affirmed the international criminality of genocide, as an example of a Gen-
eral Assembly resolution capable of creating instant custom.172 The Resolu-
tion, however, provides no more support for the DCT than the Genocide
Convention itself: although Res. 96(I) deemed genocide a “crime under in-
ternational law,” it did not affirm the idea of direct criminalization.173 On
the contrary, the Resolution’s operative provisions simply invited states “to
enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and punishment of this
crime”174 and recommended that “international co-operation be organized
between States.”175 Insofar as Res. 96(I) created (instant) custom, then, it
created a customary obligation on states to criminalize genocide domesti-
cally—the hallmark of the NCT, not the DCT.
170. Report of the Committee on the Plans for the Formulation of the Principles of the Nuremberg
Charter and Judgment, para. 2(a), quoted in UNSG Nuremberg Report, supra note 129, at 21. R
171. UNSG Nuremberg Report, supra note 129, at 21. R
172. Bin Cheng, supra note 156, at 141 (noting that the conditions for a law-making resolution R
“appear to have been satisfied, at least formally, in the case of General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11
December 1946. . .”).
173. GA Res. 96(I), The Crime of Genocide, ¶ 5, UN Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
174. Id., ¶ 6.
175. Id., ¶ 7.
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c. Res. 2625 & Res. 3314
The primary General Assembly resolutions concerning aggression are Res.
2625, the Friendly Relations Declaration,176 and Res. 3314, the Definition
of Aggression.177 Neither resolution, however, affirms that acts of aggression
are directly criminalized by international law. In fact, neither resolution
even provides much support for the criminality of aggression. The Friendly
Relations Declaration deems only a war of aggression a “crime against peace
for which there is responsibility under international law,”178 thereby implic-
itly contrasting wars of aggression (which are international crimes) with
other kinds of unfriendly acts (which are not). The Definition of Aggression,
in turn, makes that distinction explicit, affirming that “a war of aggression
is a crime against international peace,” while “[a]ggression gives rise to
international responsibility.”179 The British insisted on the differentiation,
because they wanted to ensure that any aggressive act other than a full-
blown war of aggression—following the IMT, an invasion that results in
actual hostilities between two states180—would give rise only to state
responsibility.181
4. ILC Statements
A fourth potential source of evidence for the DCT would be the ILC’s
codification of the Nuremberg Principles and the two Draft Codes of Of-
fences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. As noted earlier, all three
specifically affirm that certain acts—international crimes—are directly
criminalized by international law, irrespective of domestic criminalization.
The three ILC statements, however, actually provide no support for the
DCT. To begin with, like the CPD, the ILC’s commissioners were divided
over whether the Nuremberg Principles reflected general international
law.182 They were not even certain that the CPD wanted them to formulate
universal principles.183 As a result, the ILC issued the Nuremberg Principles
176. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(Oct. 24, 1970).
177. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, Definition of Aggression (Dec. 14, 1974).
178. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 176, art. 1. R
179. Definition of Aggression, supra note 177, art. 5(2). R
180. Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of Interna-
tional Criminal Law 180–81 (2011).
181. See Kirsten Sellars, ‘Crimes against Peace’ and International Law 280 (2013).
182. See, e.g., David S. Koller, The Nuremberg Legacy in the Historical Development of International Crimi-
nal Law, in I Historical Origins of International Criminal Law 572 (Morten Bergsmo et al. eds.,
2014) (“Given the divergent views among its members, the ILC opted not to pass judgment on the
consistency of the Nuremberg Principles with international law or on how such principles should be
applied in the future.”).
183. See Clive Parry, Some Considerations upon the Content of a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, 3 Int’l L.Q. 208, 208–09 (1950) (quoting Report of International Law Commission
covering its First Session, United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Session, Suplement No. 10,
para. 26).
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in 1950 on the basis that they had been asked not “to express an apprecia-
tion of the principles applied in the Charter and the Judgment of the Tribu-
nal at Nurnberg as principles of international law [but] . . . merely to give
formulation to those principles without any indication of their authority.”184
And even that caveat proved too much for states. The Sixth Committee was
so hopelessly divided over the legal status of the Nuremberg Principles that
the General Assembly “did not approve the principles but simply sent them
to Member States for comment”185—thereby preventing them from having
any significant law-making effect.
In contrast to the Nuremberg Principles, the ILC acknowledged from the
beginning that the Draft Codes represented the progressive development of
customary international law, not its codification.186 That does not mean, of
course, that the Codes could not have contributed to the customary status of
direct criminalization. But neither Code was ever approved by the General
Assembly: the Assembly shelved the 1954 Draft Code “pending the work of
a Special Committee set up to deal with the difficult issue of defining ag-
gression,”187 and it simply took no action with regard the 1996 Draft
Code.188 Whatever their “esteemed status,”189 therefore, the Draft Codes fail
to qualify as either state practice or opinio juris in favor of direct
criminalization.
5. International Tribunals
A final potential source of evidence for the DCT is the existence of inter-
national tribunals with jurisdiction over international crimes. Many scholars
who endorse the idea of direct criminalization emphasize the connection be-
tween international crimes and international tribunals. Einarsen, for exam-
ple, says that “[t]he difference between international crimes and
transnational crimes . . . lies in the fact that transnational crimes have not
been included as distinct crimes in any international court statute.”190 Cryer
and his co-authors adopt the same distinction.191 And Wise says simply
that, “[i]n its strictest possible sense, international criminal law would be
the law applicable in an international criminal court having general jurisdic-
184. Id. at 208-09.
185. H-H. Jescheck, State Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A Study of the Nuremberg Trial, in
Mettraux, supra note 127, at 412; see also Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaty and Custom, 9 R
Chinese J. Int’l L. 81, 103 (2010) (“. . .[T]he Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly found
such disagreement in the Commission’s report that it was impossible to state the sense of the Committee
after debate.”).
186. See, e.g., Koller, supra note 182, at 574-75. R
187. Id. at 577.
188. Ciara Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes
48–49 (2008).
189. Id. at 49.
190. Einarsen, supra note 1, at 160. R
191. Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Proce-
dure 4-5 (2nd ed. 2010); see also Patrick Robinson, The Missing Crimes, in I The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 508-09 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2000).
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tion to try those who commit acts which international law proscribes and
which it provides should be punished.”192
These scholars do not explicitly argue that the existence of international
tribunals provides support for the DCT. Simma and Paulus likely speak for
them, however, when they rely on international tribunals to explain how a
positivist can believe that international law directly criminalizes violations
of the laws of war—war crimes. They begin by noting that the Geneva
Conventions do not help establish the “international character” of such vio-
lations, because they deem only grave breaches to be war crimes—and even
then only impose an obligation on states to domestically criminalize
them.193 They also acknowledge that “actual state practice is difficult to find
here.”194 But they still insist that war crimes should be considered interna-
tional crimes, because states have created international tribunals with the
jurisdiction to prosecute them:
Modern positivism . . . considers the acceptance of the practice of
international bodies by states, e.g., in the cases of the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda Tribunals and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals,
as establishing the required opinio juris. By creating tribunals to
punish offenders of humanitarian law, states have demonstrated
that they regard violations of humanitarian law as punishable at
the international level, and thus have added practice to the—
scant—existing record.195
This argument has the virtue of clarity. How do we know that certain acts
are directly criminalized by international law? Because states have created
international tribunals that have jurisdiction to prosecute them, making do-
mestic criminalization unnecessary.
The first thing to note is that this defense of the DCT is significantly
overbroad. The argument cannot be that any crime prosecuted by an interna-
tional tribunal is directly criminalized by international law, because states
can create international tribunals to prosecute anything they want – even
crimes that have no claim to being international.196 The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, for example, had jurisdiction over crimes set out in its Preven-
192. Edward M. Wise, Codification: Perspectives and Approaches, in 1 International Criminal Law
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc.  2d ed. 1999).
193. Simma & Paulus, supra note 10, at 310–11. R
194. Id. at 311.
195. Id.; cf. Dinstein, supra note 10, at 228-29 (“But perhaps it is characteristic that the true nature of R
war crimes as international offences was elucidated beyond doubt only as an outcome of the Nuremberg
Trial, in other words, as a result of the fact that an international penal tribunal (albeit ad hoc) had been
established.”).
196. See, e.g., O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 60 (“An international criminal tribunal enjoys whatever R
subject-matter jurisdiction is vested in it by its constituent instrument . . . and there is nothing to
prevent the states or international organization which establishes the tribunal from conferring on it
jurisdiction ratione materiae over specified municipal crimes. . .”).
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tion of Cruelty to Children Act 1926 and Malicious Damage Act 1861.197
And the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has jurisdiction only over domestic
Lebanese crimes.198
How, then, might we distinguish between internationally-prosecuted
crimes that are directly criminalized by international law and internation-
ally-prosecuted crimes that are not? The most plausible answer is supplied
by the universality criterion: an international crime is an act that an interna-
tional tribunal can prosecute no matter where in the world it is commit-
ted—even in a state that considers the act legal—while an “ordinary” crime
is an act that an international tribunal can prosecute only when committed
on the territory of a state or by the nationals of a state that considers the act
criminal.
Assume, for example, the United States, Canada, and Mexico conclude a
treaty that deems killing an endangered brown bear an international crime
and then establish a tribunal that, like the ICC, has territorial and active-
nationality jurisdiction over brown-bear killing. That tribunal would be in-
ternational (because it was created by more than one state) and killing a
brown bear would be criminal under international law (because it has been
deemed a crime by an international convention). But killing a brown bear
would still not qualify as a “true” international crime under the DCT. The
DCT defines an international crime as an act that is universally criminal
because it is directly criminalized by international law, regardless of domes-
tic criminalization. The killing of a brown bear would not satisfy that defi-
nition: although it would be illegal for a Russian to kill a brown bear on
American, Canadian, or Mexican territory, a Russian would be free to kill a
brown bear on Russian territory—a purely non-international bear killing—
as long as Russia had not criminalized killing brown bears. The interna-
tional illegality of killing a brown bear could thus be limited by domestic
law—which is precisely what the DCT rules out.
The situation would be very different, of course, if the tribunal had uni-
versal jurisdiction over killing a brown bear. In that case, the tribunal would
indeed be able to prosecute anyone who kills a brown bear anywhere in the
world – even the Russian who kills a brown bear on Russian territory. Now
brown-bear killing would qualify as an international crime under the DCT,
because the international criminality of killing a brown bear would not (and
more importantly could not) be limited by domestic criminalization. Brown-
bear killing would indeed be universally criminal under international law.
This analysis raises an obvious question: why couldn’t the tribunal exer-
cise universal jurisdiction over killing brown bears? The answer is that states
197. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-U.N., art. 5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 (Jan. 16, 2002).
198. S.C. Res. 1757, attachment, art. 2(a), (May 30, 2007).
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create international tribunals by pooling their domestic jurisdiction,199 so
they cannot create an international tribunal that has greater jurisdiction
than they themselves possess. International law permits states to exercise
territorial and active-nationality jurisdiction over any act they deem crimi-
nal,200 so the US, Canada, and Mexico are free to create an international
tribunal that prosecutes brown-bear killing on their territory and by their
nationals. But international law does not currently permit states to exercise
universal jurisdiction over killing brown bears, so the United States, Ca-
nada, and Mexico could not create an international tribunal that exercises
universal jurisdiction over brown-bear killing.
Only one kind of international tribunal, therefore, even potentially pro-
vides support for the DCT: namely, a tribunal formed by states to prosecute
acts over which they are individually entitled to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion. If universal jurisdiction exists over a particular act, states could dele-
gate their universal jurisdiction to an international tribunal. That
international tribunal would then itself have universal jurisdiction and
would be able to prosecute the act no matter where it was committed—even
in a state that refused to domestically criminalize it.
Notice, though, that this analysis suggests the internationality of a tribu-
nal is much less important than the type of crime the tribunal prosecutes.
An international tribunal created by 190 of 196 states would provide no
support for the DCT if none of the acts it prosecuted permitted universal
jurisdiction: although the pooled jurisdiction of those states would permit
the tribunal to prosecute those acts almost everywhere in the world, there
would still be states in which those acts could be committed without fear of
prosecution. The international criminalization of the acts would thus still be
limited by domestic law—which is exactly what the DCT prohibits.
Conversely, an international tribunal created by only two states would
support the DCT as long as there was universal jurisdiction over the acts it
prosecuted. Practical problems aside—evidence collection, extradition, and
so on—the pooled jurisdiction of the two states would enable the tribunal to
prosecute those acts no matter where they were committed. Those acts could
thus be legitimately considered universally criminal under international law,
because they would be punishable by an international tribunal even when
committed in a state that refused to criminalize them.
There is, of course, a possible objection to this analysis: namely, that it
confuses jurisdiction with criminality. Although no court can prosecute an
199. See e.g., Quincy Wright, The Law of Nuremberg, 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 38, 49 (1947) (“If each party
to the Charter could exercise such jurisdiction individually, they can agree to set up an international
tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction jointly.”); Kaul & Kress, supra note 142, at 145 (defending “the very R
simple idea that states must be entitled to do collectively what they have the power to do individually”);
Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment 132
(2010) (“This delegation framework would successfully explain most aspects of the jurisdictional scope
the ICC has as a matter of law.”).
200. See, e.g., Cryer et al., supra note 191, at 46–47.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\58-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 34 14-FEB-18 9:00
386 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 58
act that is not criminal, an act can be criminal even if no court exists to
prosecute it.201 At least in theory, therefore, an act could be directly
criminalized by international law even if no international tribunal currently
exists that has global jurisdiction over it.
If states could create an international tribunal with global reach but sim-
ply have not, this objection would have force. But it seems metaphysical—
the ICL version of a tree falling in the forest—to consider an act directly
criminalized by international law even if states are not capable of creating an
international tribunal that could prosecute that act no matter where it was
committed. On the contrary, the impossibility of a genuinely universal in-
ternational tribunal would serve as powerful evidence against the idea of
direct criminalization, because it would foreground the dependence of inter-
national criminalization on domestic criminalization.
As we have seen, the pooling of domestic universal jurisdiction provides
one mechanism for creating an international tribunal that could prosecute
certain acts no matter where they are committed. Are there others? The
most promising alternative would be the Security Council acting pursuant
to Article 41 of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Council to “decide
what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions.”202 If the Security Council could create the ICTY
and ICTR over Serbia’s and Rwanda’s objections, could it not create—polit-
ical obstacles aside—an international tribunal that had the authority to
prosecute international crimes committed anywhere in the world, even in
states that considered those acts legal?
Actually, no. The Security Council was able to create the ICTY and ICTR
over Serbia and Rwanda’s objections because Yugoslavia203 and Rwanda had
ratified the UN Charter, thereby consenting to the Security Council’s ability
to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to restore international peace
and security.204 The Security Council has no Chapter VII authority over
states that are not members of the UN; with regard to them, it is only able
to issue “non-binding recommendations and proposals.”205 So although the
Security Council could create an international tribunal with nearly universal
jurisdiction, it could not create one with jurisdiction over international
201. Meron, supra note 52, at 561. R
202. U.N. Charter art. 41, 1 U.N.T.S. 16 (Oct. 24, 1945).
203. Serbia did not become a member of the UN until 2002. Although Yugoslavia might not have
existed at the time of the ICTY’s creation, its previous membership in the UN meant that it had con-
sented to the Security Council exercising its authority on Yugoslav territory.
204. U.N. Charter, supra note 202, art. 4(1). R
205. Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Consti-
tutional Perspective 90 (1998); see also Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 1268
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2012) (“Particular problems arise with respect to enforcement measures against
non-member States. Vis-a-vis these third States, the justification of measures can hardly be based on the
Charter itself.”). As De Wet notes, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland both consistently
took this position prior to becoming UN members. Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the
United Nations Security Council 98 (2004).
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crimes committed on the territory of states that are not members of the
UN—the Vatican, Palestine, Kosovo, and perhaps Taiwan206—or on the
territory of any state that chose to leave the UN in the future.207 The univer-
sality of the international crimes prosecuted by such a tribunal would thus
still be contingent upon the willingness of non-member states to consent to
its jurisdiction, a limitation that is inconsistent with the idea of direct
criminalization.
In short, an international tribunal must be based on universal jurisdiction
for its practice to even potentially support the DCT. The actually-existing
international tribunals thus contribute little to the customary status of di-
rect criminalization. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and the ICTY are based solely on territorial jurisdiction,208
while the ICTR, ICC, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia are based on territorial and active-nationality jurisdiction.209 In
fact, only one international tribunal has ever exercised universal jurisdiction:
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in East Timor, which was cre-
ated by the UN in 2000.210
It is important to note that these jurisdictional limits also doom any at-
tempt to defend direct criminalization on the ground that few states have
ever challenged the legitimacy of international tribunals prosecuting inter-
national crimes.211 There is no question that, in the right circumstances,
inaction can count as state practice212 or opinio juris.213 With regard to direct
criminalization, though, states’ failure to protest the creation of the interna-
tional tribunals does not qualify as either. Most importantly, as just noted,
the SPSC—a toothless tribunal the UN promptly forgot214—is the only in-
206. See De Wet, supra note 205, at 97. R
207. Such a tribunal could, of course, prosecute international crimes committed on the territory of a
non-member state by a national of a member-state. We are dealing here with purely internal interna-
tional crimes – the kind addressed by universal jurisdiction.
208. Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Art. 1, S/RES/1757 (2007) (May 30, 2007); SCSL
Statute, supra note 197, Art. 1(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla- R
via, Art. 1, SC Res. 827, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
209. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 1, NS/RKM/
1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 1, SC Res.
955, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Rome Statute, supra note 35, Art. 12(2). R
210. Regulation on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal
Offenses, § 2(1), UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000).
211. Brazil and China both initially challenged the Security Council’s authority to create the ICTY,
but neither voted against Res. 827 and the Tribunal famously upheld its kompetenz-kompetenz in Tadic´. See
Cryer, supra note 54, at 53–54. R
212. See ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 36; ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 2. R
213. See ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 3 (“Failure to react over time to a practice may serve R
as evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris), provided that States were in a position to react and the
circumstances called for some reaction.”).
214. See, e.g., David Cohen, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations and the Politics of
International Justice in East Timor, East-West Center Special Reports, No. 9 http://
www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/indifference-and-accountability-united-nations-and-politics-inter-
national-justice-east-.
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ternational tribunal whose jurisdiction even conceivably supports the idea of
direct criminalization. States’ acquiescence to the creation of tribunals with
more limited forms of jurisdiction based on state consent cannot help estab-
lish direct criminalization.
Moreover, even if direct criminalization were the basis for the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL being able to prosecute international crimes, their focus on
specific conflicts involving a small number of states would make it difficult
to view state silence as acquiescence. As Cryer has noted, states are willing
to grant authority to “safe” international tribunals that they would never
tolerate in “unsafe” international tribunals – tribunals whose rules might
apply to them, as well.215 The creation of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL thus
hardly “called for some reaction” on the part of unaffected states.216 Indeed,
it is revealing that when states created the ICC, an “unsafe” tribunal, states
pointedly refused to grant it universal jurisdiction.
6. The Basis of Universal Jurisdiction
But doesn’t even the possibility of the international community creating a
tribunal with universal jurisdiction over the core international crimes sup-
port the idea of direct criminalization? After all, it is widely assumed that
customary international law permits states to exercise universal jurisdiction
over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide,217 and a number of
scholars have pointed out that there was no legal reason why the ICC could
not have been based on universal jurisdiction instead of on territorial and
active-nationality jurisdiction.218
This argument, however, presumes that the existence of universal juris-
diction provides support for direct criminalization. In fact, that is not the
case. Although universal jurisdiction clearly establishes that an act is univer-
sally criminal under international law, it does not necessarily establish that an
act is directly criminalized by international law. The latter is true only if the
availability of universal jurisdiction is a consequence of an act being directly
criminalized by international law. If universal jurisdiction exists because all
states are obligated to domestically criminalize an act, the existence of uni-
versal jurisdiction—and thus the possibility of its use by an international
tribunal through delegation—supports the NCT, not the DCT.
215. Cryer, supra note 54, at 238. R
216. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that silence in the face of a practice counts as R
acquiescence only if “the circumstances called for some reaction”).
217. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 53, at 151. R
218. See, e.g., Chehtman, supra note 199, at 132 (“This delegation framework would successfully R
explain most aspects of the jurisdictional scope the ICC has as a matter of law. States would be able to
delegate their territorial criminal jurisdiction to the ICC, and they would also be entitled to delegate
their universal jurisdiction.”); Bekou & Cryer, supra note 142, at 50-51 (“States are entitled to assert R
universal jurisdiction over international crimes. The ICC operates on the basis of delegated jurisdiction
from its State parties. They would, therefore, be entitled to have passed on universal jurisdiction to the
ICC.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\58-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 37 14-FEB-18 9:00
2017 / Heller – International Crime 389
A number of scholars who define an international crime as an act that is
directly criminalized by international law also believe that one consequence
of international criminalization is the availability of universal jurisdiction.219
Ambos, for example, claims that universal jurisdiction is the purest manifes-
tation of direct criminalization: “universal prosecutability, in addition to
individual criminal responsibility, results from the fact that only the former
allows for prosecution irrespective of national laws (and traditional jurisdic-
tional links), and that this is the only way in which states can express their
serious interest in the recognition of a certain conduct as a crime under ICL
stricto sensu.” 220 In a similar vein, Kress argues that the “true test” for
whether universal jurisdiction exists for a particular act “would seem to be
whether states agree to the internationalization of the criminal law rule and
create a crime under international law.”221
This connection, however, raises an important question: what is the posi-
tivist basis for the idea that universal jurisdiction is a consequence of direct
criminalization? We can imagine what such a basis would look like. A law-
making treaty with universal or near-universal ratification, for example,
could assert that a particular act is directly criminalized by international law
and thus permits universal jurisdiction. But no such treaty exists. As we
have seen, only one multilateral treaty actually affirms direct criminaliza-
tion—the Statute of Limitations Convention—and that treaty says nothing
about universal jurisdiction. Even more importantly, all of the treaties that
do make use of universal jurisdiction—such as the Geneva Conventions and
the Apartheid Convention—function as suppression conventions, requiring
domestic criminalization.
Alternatively, a widely supported General Assembly resolution could af-
firm that universal jurisdiction is a consequence of direct criminalization.
219. See, e.g., Princeton Principles, supra note 17, at 28 (“Universal jurisdiction may be exercised by a R
competent and ordinary judicial body of any state in order to try a person duly accused of committing
serious crimes under international law.”); Kaul & Kress, supra note 142, at 145 (“The universality ap- R
proach starts from the assumption that, under current international law, all states may exercise universal
jurisdiction over the above-listed core crimes of international law.”); Robert Cryer, Royalism and the King:
Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Politics of Sources, 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 390, 394 (2009) (arguing
that universal jurisdiction “only inheres over those crimes as defined in international law”); Werle &
Jessberger, supra note 51, at 73 (noting that it follows from the universal nature of international crimes R
“that the international community is empowered to prosecute and punish these crimes, regardless of who
committed them or against whom they were committed”); Einarsen, supra note 1, at 139 (arguing that R
“the special character of the crimes themselves” is what justifies and implies “universal jurisdiction lex
lata”).
220. Kai Ambos, II Treatise on International Criminal Law: The Crimes and Sentencing
227 (2014).
221. Claus Kress, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International, 4
J. Int’l Crim. Just. 561, 568 (2006). (emphasis in original); cf. Boister, supra note 10, at 963-64 R
(claiming that, because they are directly criminalized by international law, international crimes “are
subject to a permissive ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ universal jurisdiction established by general international
law”); Einarsen, supra note 1, at 139 (insisting on the international/transnational distinction, because if R
the distinction is blurred, “the procedural consequences of the crimes (universal jurisdiction) may be
used to legally identify the ‘international crimes’ rather than the special character of the crimes them-
selves justifying and implying universal jurisdiction lex lata”).
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But no General Assembly resolution concerning the core international
crimes even mentions universal jurisdiction.
Finally, and perhaps most promisingly, states could agree with Ambos
and Kress and assert that their right to use universal jurisdiction flows from
international law’s direct criminalization of certain acts. Only South Africa,
however, has explicitly taken that position222—and its own Constitutional
Court disagrees.223 As discussed in more detail below, the overwhelming
majority of states make use of universal jurisdiction in ways that are incon-
sistent with the idea of direct criminalization. Fifty-seven states incorporate
universal jurisdiction only when a treaty requires them to do so. And 59
states view universal jurisdiction as a strictly subsidiary form of jurisdiction,
available only when the territorial state is unwilling or unable to prosecute
the act in question itself224—a requirement that foregrounds the necessity of
domestic criminalization.
From a positivist perspective, then, state practice and opinio juris provide
negligible support for the idea that universal jurisdiction automatically
flows from the direct criminalization of certain acts by international law.
That connection seems to be little more than an article of faith—a naturalist
idea that is not capable of being disconfirmed. If universal jurisdiction really
is the only way “states can express their serious interest in the recognition of
a certain conduct as a crime under ICL,” it is reasonable to assume that
states would have affirmed the connection themselves.
C. Conclusion
Almost without exception, ICL scholars have explained the universal
criminality of the core international crimes—war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, genocide, and aggression—by claiming that they involve acts that
are directly criminalized by international law, irrespective of domestic
criminalization. This Part has demonstrated, however, that the positivist
case for the DCT is extremely weak. The idea of direct criminalization
emerges the most clearly in the IMT judgment and in the work of the ILC,
but judgments and expert statements are merely subsidiary means for deter-
mining customary international law. Moreover, the most promising primary
sources of custom—multilateral treaties, domestic criminalization and pros-
ecutions, General Assembly resolutions, and the practice of international
tribunals—not only provide little support for direct criminalization, they
222. Statement submitted by South Africa, reply to Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 19, at 2 (taking position that international crimes are “directly punishable under international R
law itself”).
223. National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v. Southern African Human Rights Litigation
Centre and Another, para. 61, 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC) (holding that “investigating international crimes
committed abroad is permissible only if the country with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to prose-
cute”). As explained in the next Part, subsidiarity is consistent with the NCT, not the DCT.
224. See Appendix.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\58-2\HLI205.txt unknown Seq: 39 14-FEB-18 9:00
2017 / Heller – International Crime 391
appear to support the very definition of an international crime as an act that
international law obligates all states to domestically criminalize.
IV. THE NATIONAL CRIMINALIZATION THESIS
A. Definition
Rejecting the direct-criminalization thesis on positivist grounds does not
require abandoning the idea that international crimes are universally crimi-
nal. Nor does it mean rejecting the possibility of a positivist definition of an
international crime. It simply means that we must consider a very different
definition: namely, that an international crime is an act that international
law obligates every state in the world to criminalize.
Thus defined, there are two basic aspects to the national-criminalization
thesis. First, international law must obligate, not simply permit, states to
criminalize a particular act. Authorization to criminalize an act is clearly not
sufficient, because it leaves open the possibility that states will refuse to
criminalize that act, which is inconsistent with the universality criterion for
an international crime. Second, and relatedly, international law must obli-
gate all states, not simply some states, to criminalize a particular act. If even
one state is free to permit the commission of a particular act on its territory,
that act cannot be considered universally criminal.
B. Pedigree
This definition of an international crime is clearly well outside of the ICL
mainstream. But it is far from unprecedented. For example, there are natu-
ralist intimations of the NCT in Grotius, who argued that international law
prohibited states from giving refuge to an individual who had committed an
“offence against human society” abroad. Faced with such a situation, Gro-
tius insisted, “that State where the convicted Offender lives or has taken
Shelter, should, upon Application being made to it, either punish the de-
manded Person according to his Demerits, or else deliver him up to be
treated at the Discretion of the injured Party”225 —an aut dedere aut judicare
obligation that is predicated upon domestic criminalization.
To be sure, Grotius believed that states had the right, not the obligation,
to criminalize offences against human society,226 which means that his the-
ory cannot be considered a direct forerunner of the NCT. Georg
Schwarzenberger, by contrast, adopted a limited form of the NCT in his
groundbreaking 1950 article “The Problem of an International Criminal
225. Hugo Grotius, II De Jure Belli ac Pacis, ch. XXI, 1062 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005).
226. Id. at 1061 (arguing, with regard to offences against human society, that “[s]ince the Establish-
ment of States and Communities, it is judged reasonable to transfer this Right [of punishment] to the
respective States or their Sovereigns, according to whose Discretion all Faults, as do properly concern
them, are to be punished or remitted.”).
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Law.” Schwarzenberger specifically rejected the idea that international law
directly criminalized acts such as war crimes and genocide.227 Instead, he
believed that international law either permits or requires all states to
criminalize certain acts —the latter being the defining characteristic of the
NCT. War crimes fall into the first category, because international law sim-
ply permits states “to assume an extraordinary criminal jurisdiction under
their own municipal law” for violations of the law of war.228 Piracy within
territorial seas, however, falls into the second category: because “[e]very
State is under an international obligation to suppress piracy” on its territory,
“[t]o the extent to which, for the purpose of countering piracy, a State re-
quires of necessity the assistance of its municipal criminal law, such law may
be considered to be internationally prescribed.”229
Finally, until recently,230 Bassiouni—one of the primary architects of
modern ICL—took the position that ICL was essentially conterminous with
the NCT. When Bassiouni presented his draft international criminal code in
1980, he made almost no mention of the possibility of international law
directly criminalizing certain acts. Instead, he emphasized that ICL had
originally developed through domestic criminalization obligations and
would almost certainly continue to develop that way in the future:
The approach will remain the same; international criminal law
will rely on the municipal legal system to enforce its criminal
sanctions and on the international legal system to provide means
by which a given municipal system will be required to carry out
that task (e.g., by allowing universal jurisdiction, requiring prose-
cution or imposing a duty of extradition and developing new rules
on extradition and cooperation in penal matters). Since all sources
and aspects of international criminal law ultimately lead to the
right or duty of a municipal system to prosecute (for internation-
ally defined crimes relying upon the theory of universality) or in
the alternative, the duty to extradite to another municipal system
for such prosecution, it appears, therefore, that the only civitas
maxima of international criminal law which now exists is the one
proposed by Hugo Grotius in 1624: aut dedere aut punier with per-
haps one modification that it should be aut dedere aut judicare.231
227. Schwarzenberger, ICL, supra note 76, at 295 (“[I]n the present state of world society, interna- R
tional criminal law in any true sense does not exist.”).
228. Id. at 270.
229. Id. at 269.
230. Bassiouni now endorses the DCT. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity 475
(2011).
231. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal
Code 24 (1980).
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The NCT is also not inconsistent with the IMT’s insistence that interna-
tional obligations transcend domestic ones. Recall the judgment’s most fa-
mous paragraph, quoted above232:
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced
. . .  individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.
Given the subsequent work of the ILC, the IMT judges almost certainly
intended this paragraph to affirm the idea of direct criminalization. But it
does not have to be read that way. The first sentence says only that individu-
als who violate international law have to be punished; it neither insists that
punishment be imposed by an international tribunal directly applying inter-
national law nor rules out the possibility of states indirectly enforcing inter-
national law’s prohibitions. Similarly, the second sentence says only that
states cannot permit individuals to act in ways that international law for-
bids—a formulation that is in no way inconsistent with the idea that inter-
national law forbids an act by requiring all states to domestically criminalize
it.
Like the NCT itself, this reading of the IMT judgment is not without
precedent. In 1947, for example, Schwarzenberger denied that the judgment
had created ICL in any “material sense”—namely as involving direct
criminalization. On the contrary, he insisted, “[w]ithin the framework of
the Charter, the Nuremberg Tribunal has extended the normal range of mu-
nicipal jurisdiction in the field of criminal justice and, in this respect, assim-
ilated jurisdiction in crimes under the Charter to jurisdiction in war crimes
under customary international law.”233 Ten years later, Jescheck insisted
that “one of the most important and most beneficial effects of the Nurem-
berg judgment” is “the recognition of criminal liability for serious offences
against the international law of warfare and the obligation on states to prose-
cute them.”234 And more recently, O’Keefe has acknowledged that ambigui-
ties in the IMT judgment mean that “individual responsibility for a ‘crime
against international law’ or a ‘crime under international law’ could be char-
acterized as a function of state responsibility and, additionally, as ultimately
arising not under international law itself but under national law.”235
C. Legal Foundation
The NCT obviously presupposes that international law is capable of obli-
gating all states to criminalize the commission of certain acts. There are two
232. See supra note 57. R
233. Schwarzenberger, Judgment, supra note 133, at 188. R
234. Jescheck, supra note 185, at 417. R
235. O’Keefe, supra note 2, at 75. R
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possible sources for such an obligation. The first is straightforward: a univer-
sally-ratified treaty that requires domestic criminalization. Anything less
than universal ratification does not suffice, because it leaves open the possi-
bility that the act in question will remain legal in states that choose not to
ratify the treaty.
The other possible source of a universal obligation to criminalize is cus-
tomary international law. That source is more promising, because customary
rules generally apply to all states equally. Once again, though, we are faced
with the problem of persistent objection: if a state objects to the formation
of a criminalization obligation, it will not be obligated to criminalize the act
in question. The universality criterion thus likely limits international crimes
to acts that states have a jus cogens obligation to criminalize, making persis-
tent objection impossible.
This jus cogens requirement, however, raises a disquieting possibility:
namely, that it may be difficult to defend the international criminality of at
least some of the international crimes without resorting to a problematic
naturalism. The secondary rules governing the creation of jus cogens norms
are famously vague; indeed, the ILC itself acknowledged in its report on the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) —the treaty that first
introduced the idea of jus cogens into positive law236—that “[t]he formula-
tion of the rule, however, is not free from difficulty, since there is not as yet
a generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of interna-
tional law as having the character of jus cogens.”237 There is no question,
though, that the evidentiary requirements for a jus cogens norm are excep-
tionally high—the logical consequence of the fact that such norms, unlike
“ordinary” rules of custom, are specifically non-consensual, binding even
states that persistently object to them.238 According to the VCLT, “a per-
emptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recog-
nized by the international community of States as a whole.”239 Universal
agreement is not required; as Nieto-Navia notes, the VCLT drafting com-
mittee added the “as a whole” language to Art. 53 “to avoid a situation
whereby one State could effectively veto a decision to designate a norm as
peremptory.”240 But it is unclear how many states must accept and recog-
236. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 8 ILM 679, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
237. Quoted in Eric Suy, Article 53, in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A
Commentary 1224, 1227 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
238. See, e.g., Jure Vidmar, Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical Interna-
tional Legal System?, in Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights 13, 27
(Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012) (noting that “where peremptory norms are concerned, norms
can be binding on a state not only without its consent but also despite the state‘s explicit opposition”);
A. J. J. de Hoogh, The Relationship Between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes:
Peremptory Norms in Perspective, 42 Austrian J. Pub. Int’l L. 183, 186 (1991) (“To state that a norm is
peremptory means that it is binding on all States alike, whether they are opposed to it or not.”).
239. VCLT, supra note 236, art. 53. R
240. Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian
Law 10 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished article), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf.
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nize a particular norm for it to represent the will of the “international com-
munity of States as a whole.” According to the chairman of the drafting
committee, “it would be enough if a very large majority did so” —a thresh-
old designed to prevent “a very small number of States” from blocking the
emergence of a jus cogens norm.241 What constitutes a “very large majority”
or a “small number of States,” the chairman regrettably failed to specify.
This uncertainty notwithstanding, state practice and opinio juris provide
far greater support for the existence of universal, non-derogable obligations
to criminalize than for the idea of direct criminalization. In particular, the
NCT can rely on three material sources of international law that the DCT
cannot:
1. A multilateral treaty that contains an obligation to domestically criminalize a
particular act. By definition, such a treaty—a suppression convention—
does not help establish direct criminalization. A suppression convention
that is intended to have law-making effect and is very widely ratified,
however, provides powerful evidence in favor of a universal obligation
to criminalize. According to the ILC, conventions that deal with “seri-
ous crimes of international concern” are particularly likely to fall into
the law-making category.242
2. National legislation incorporating international crimes into a state’s penal code.
As discussed earlier, such incorporation does not help establish direct
criminalization, because there is almost no evidence that states incorpo-
rate international crimes because they believe the acts in question are
directly criminalized by international law. By contrast, incorporation
can help establish a universal obligation to criminalize—particularly
when the incorporating state is not under a conventional obligation to
do so.243
3. UNGA resolutions that affirm the obligation of states to domestically criminal-
ize a particular act. Resolutions in this category provide significant evi-
dence of a universal obligation to criminalize, particularly when
adopted by a large majority of states and when states adopt a series of
resolutions affirming the same rules. Such resolutions include those that
affirm an aut dedere aut judicare obligation: because “the judicare part of
the obligation to extradite or prosecute can only mean . . . to submit the
case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,”244 the
obligation necessarily requires (prior) domestic criminalization.
Given these material sources, can we say that states have a jus cogens obliga-
tion to criminalize acts traditionally viewed as international crimes?
241. Quoted in Suy, supra note 237, at 1228. R
242. See ILC Extradite or Prosecute Paper, supra note 91, at 69. R
243. See, e.g., ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 46 (noting that state practice counts toward the R
creation of a customary rule when “non-parties in relation to parties or between themselves adopt a
practice in line with that prescribed (or authorized) by the treaty”).
244. Van Steenberghe, supra note 149, at 1108. R
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1. War Crimes
The strongest case for such an obligation concerns the grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions.245 The Geneva Conventions specifically require
states parties “to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention.”246 The Conventions are quintes-
sential examples of a “law-making treaty” in which “states elaborate their
perception of international law upon any given topic or establish new rules
which are to guide them for the future in their international conduct.”247
Their universal ratification thus strongly suggests that the obligation to
criminalize grave breaches—like all of the Conventions’ substantive obliga-
tions—would apply to any new state that might emerge, regardless of its
willingness to be bound.248
Grave breaches of the First Additional Protocol are more complicated. AP
I is intended to make general international law, but it is less widely ratified
than the Geneva Conventions—174 states parties as of this writing, 89% of
the world’s 196 states.249 That is still, however, a “very large majority of
states.” Moreover, a number of states not party to AP I or not party at the
time of incorporation nevertheless criminalize one or more of the Protocol-
specific grave breaches, including Azerbaijan,250 Bangladesh,251 Indonesia,252
Israel,253 Italy,254 and the United States.255 Such non-treaty-based practice
provides additional evidence that the obligation to criminalize AP I grave
breaches is, in fact, jus cogens.
Criminalizing war crimes in international armed conflict (IAC) that do
not qualify as grave breaches also likely qualifies as a jus cogens obligation.
Although states are not under any conventional obligation to criminalize
such acts, approximately 140 have nevertheless criminalized one or more of
245. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 103, art. 147. R
246. Id., art. 146.
247. Shaw, supra note 98, at 95; see also Brownlie’s Public International Law, supra note 81, at R
31 (“Although treaties are as such binding only on the parties, the number of parties, the explicit
acceptance of these rules by states generally and, in some cases, the declaratory character of the provisions
combine to produce a powerful law-creating effect.”); Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on
Identification of Customary International Law, 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672, at 57 (2014) (“[W]hen States
accept (within the treaty or in the negotiations leading up to it or upon or after its adoption) that the
treaty or certain provisions in it are declaratory of existing customary international law, this may serve as
clear evidence of ‘acceptance as law’.”).
248. Cf. Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International
Criminal Court, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 481, 490 (2003).
249. ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470.
250. 1 ICRC Custom Study Vol. I, supra note 134, at 576 n.42. R
251. 2 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Prac-
tice 3863–64 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
252. 1 ICRC Custom Study, supra note 134, at 576 n.42. R
253. 2 ICRC Custom Study, supra note 251, at 301–02. R
254. 1 ICRC Custom Study, supra note 134, at 576 n.42. R
255. 2 ICRC Custom Study, supra note 251, at 304–5. R
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them.256 Moreover, a series of General Assembly resolutions adopted during
the Cold War reinforce that practice by specifically affirming the duty of
states to criminalize all war crimes in international armed conflict: Res.
2583 (XXIV),257 adopted in 1969 with 74 states voting in favor, five op-
posed, and 32 abstaining; Res. 2840 (XXVI),258 adopted in 1971 with 71
states voting in favor, no states voting against, and 42 states abstaining; and
Res. 3074 (XXVIII),259 adopted in 1973 with 94 states voting in favor, no
states voting against, and 20 states abstaining. As van Steenberghe notes,
the 1971 and 1973 resolutions carry particular weight, because “no state
voted against [them] and the reasons for abstention were not concerned with
the recognition of an obligation to extradite or prosecute.”260 Moreover, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution by consensus in 2005—Res. 60/147
—that specifically affirms that all states have an obligation to criminalize
“serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes
under international law.”261
The most difficult question is whether states have a jus cogens obligation to
criminalize war crimes in non-international armed conflict (NIAC). There is
no conventional obligation to criminalize those acts, and fewer states
criminalize war crimes in NIAC than criminalize non-grave-breaches in
IAC. That said, a number of factors nevertheless support the existence of a
criminalization obligation. First, nearly 100 states do, in fact, criminalize
war crimes in NIAC, despite the absence of any conventional obligation to
do so.262 Second, although war crimes in NIAC did not exist when the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted Resolutions 2583, 2840, and 3074, they were well
established by 2005, when it adopted Res. 60/147. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the General Assembly unanimously adopted Res. 50/200 in 1996,
which specifically recalled and reaffirmed, in the context of the Rwanda
256. See Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 12. R
257. G.A. Res. 2583 (XXIV), Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons who have
Committed Crimes against Humanity (Question of Punishment), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2583, ¶ 1 (Dec. 15,
1969) (calling upon “all the States concerned to take the necessary measures for . . . the detection, arrest,
extradition, and punishment of all war criminals and persons guilty of crimes against humanity”).
258. G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who
Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2840, ¶ 4 (Dec. 18, 1971) (affirming
“that refusal by States to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial, and punishment of persons guilty of
war crimes and crimes against humanity is contrary to . . . generally recognized norms of international
law”).
259. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, U.N. Doc.
A/9030/Add.1, ¶ 5 (Dec. 3, 1973) (declaring that “[p]ersons against whom there is evidence that they
have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity shall be subject to trial . . . as a general rule in
the countries in which they committed those crimes”).
260. Van Steenberghe notes that none of the states that abstained did so because they took issue with
the obligation to criminalize. Van Steenberghe, supra note 149, at 1100. R
261. G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repa-
ration for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147, ¶ 4 (Dec. 16, 2005).
262. See, e.g., 1 ICRC Custom Study Vol. I, supra note 134, at 591–603 (collecting examples). R
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genocide and its connected NIAC, “the obligations of all states to punish all
persons who commit . . . grave violations of international humanitarian
law.”263
These material sources clearly count toward a jus cogens obligation to
criminalize war crimes in NIAC. It is also possible to argue that the 124
ratifications of the Rome Statute, which criminalizes a wide variety of acts
in NIAC, provide additional support for that obligation. Although the
Rome Statute’s principle of complementarity does not require states to in-
corporate the crimes in Articles 6-8,264 the Preamble to the Rome Statute
specifically recalls “that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”265 The use of
“recalling” is particularly important, because it indicates that the drafters of
the Rome Statute believed the duty to prosecute international crimes existed
under customary international law prior to the Statute’s adoption.266 Indeed,
both states and scholars have read the Preamble to support the idea that
customary international law obligates states to incorporate international
crimes into their domestic penal codes.267
2. Genocide
There is also a very strong case to be made that states have a jus cogens
obligation to criminalize genocide. 147 states have ratified the Genocide
Convention, which requires state parties “to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provi-
sions of the present Convention.”268 Approximately 118 states have actually
criminalized genocide domestically269—including 16 states that have not or
had not at the time of incorporation ratified the Genocide Convention.270
General Assembly Res. 96(I), which was adopted unanimously and which
Bin Cheng cites as a classic example of a resolution capable of creating in-
stant custom,271 invited all states to criminalize genocide, while Res. 50/200
goes even further, recalling and reaffirming the obligation of all states to
263. See G.A. Res. 50/200, Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/200, pmbl.,
para. 6 (Mar. 11, 1996). The U.N. Commission on Human Rights took a similar position in the context
of the conflict in Sierra Leone. See Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/1, Situation of Human
Rights in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/1, ¶ 2 (Apr. 6, 1999).
264. Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 Harv. Int’l L.J. 86, 88 (2012).
265. Rome Statute, supra note 35, pmbl., para. 6. R
266. See Triffterer, supra note 9, at 11. R
267. See, e.g., Statement of Kenya, Sixth Committee, Summary Record of the 12th Meeting 8 [herein-
after 12th Meeting 2014], U.N. Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.12 (Dec. 9, 2014); D. Robinson, supra note 248, at R
493; Antonio Cassese et al., The Rome Statute: a Tentative Assessment, in Cassese et al., supra note 191, at R
1906 (same).
268. Genocide Convention, supra note 118, art. V. R
269. Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 13. R
270. Andorra, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Dominica, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, In-
donesia, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, Niger, Samoa, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. Id. at 16–21.
271. Bin Cheng, supra note 156, at 141. R
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prosecute genocide.272 And finally, the Human Rights Council has consist-
ently emphasized “the responsibility of each individual State to protect its
population from genocide, which entails the prevention of such a crime,
including incitement to it, through appropriate and necessary means.”273
Resolutions of international organizations count as the practice of the indi-
vidual states that vote in favor of the resolution.274
3. Crimes Against Humanity
The case for a jus cogens obligation to criminalize crimes against humanity
is more complicated, because only the Apartheid Convention specifically re-
quires their criminalization and far fewer states have criminalized crimes
against humanity—approximately 90—than have criminalized war crimes
or genocide.275 Finding a jus cogens obligation to criminalize thus likely re-
quires giving great weight to the Preamble of the Rome Statute, with the
Statute’s 125 ratifications, and to General Assembly resolutions like Res.
2840 and Res. 3074, both of which affirm the obligation to criminalize
crimes against humanity as well as war crimes.276 Those material sources, in
turn, are supported by the resolutions of other international organizations—
particularly Res. 2005/81 of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
adopted by consensus, which “[r]ecognizes that States must prosecute or
extradite perpetrators, including accomplices, of international crimes such
as. . . crimes against humanity. . . in accordance with their international
obligations”277; and Res. 2225 of the Organization of American States,
adopted unanimously, which urges member states “to combat impunity and
to prosecute or extradite, in accordance with their obligations under interna-
tional law, those responsible for all violations of . . .  crimes against human-
ity . . . in order to bring them to justice.”278
4. Aggression
It is extremely unlikely that states have a jus cogens obligation to criminal-
ize aggression—even wars of aggression. Prior to the Rome Statute, no
treaty encouraged states to criminalize aggression, much less required them
to do so. Nor is it possible to base an obligation to criminalize aggression on
General Assembly resolutions, because neither the Friendly Relations Decla-
ration nor the Definition of Aggression requires criminalization. Moreover,
272. See G.A. Res. 50/200, supra note 263, Preamble, para. 6. R
273. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 22/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/L.30, ¶ 2 (Mar. 18, 2013).
274. See ILA Custom Report, supra note 15, at 19; ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 15, at 2. R
275. See Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 12–13. R
276. See G.A. Res. 2840, supra note 258, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 3074, supra note 259, ¶ 5. R
277. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 2005/81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/81, ¶ 2 (Apr. 21,
2005).
278. Org. of Am. States, AG/RES. 2225 (XXXVI-O/06), Cooperation among the Member States of
the Organization of American States to Ensure the Protection of Human Rights and Fight Impunity, ¶ 1
(June 6, 2006).
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very few states actually criminalize aggression—approximately 37.279 The
only conceivable basis for a jus cogens obligation is thus the Rome Statute,
with its recently-adopted definition of aggression. But that is a difficult
argument to make, given that only 32 states have ratified the aggression
amendments and seven of those states had already criminalized
aggression.280
D. Universal Jurisdiction
As we have seen in previous parts, there is a necessary connection between
universal jurisdiction and the idea of universal criminality. Universal juris-
diction is the primary international-law vehicle for affirming the idea that
certain acts are universally criminal. And it is precisely the possibility of
delegating universal jurisdiction to an international tribunal that makes it
possible—in theory if not yet in practice—for states to create an interna-
tional tribunal that could prosecute international crimes no matter where
they are committed.
We have also seen, however, that there is no positivist basis for the idea—
critical to the DCT—that universal jurisdiction exists because certain acts
are directly criminalized by international law. No treaty affirms that rela-
tionship. No UN resolution does. Only one state has explicitly affirmed that
relationship in connection with its use of universal jurisdiction—and that
state’s own highest court disagrees.
The NCT, by contrast, provides a much stronger positivist explanation of
universal jurisdiction. Simply put, considerable state practice and opinio juris
indicate that universal jurisdiction depends upon a universal obligation to
criminalize a particular act, because it is precisely a state’s failure to prose-
cute an international crime committed on its territory that justifies other
states disregarding traditional limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction.
First, when states draft a treaty that requires universal jurisdiction over a
particular act, they almost always281 require domestic criminalization of that
act, as well. That is true, as noted earlier, for the two treaties that concern
the core international crimes: the Geneva Conventions and the Apartheid
Convention. And it is true for suppression conventions generally,282 from the
279. See Status of Ratification and Implementation, The Global Campaign for Ratification and
Implementation of the Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, http://crimeofag-
gression.info/the-role-of-states/status-of-ratification-and-implementation/ (last updated Sept. 23, 2016).
280. Id.
281. The only exception seems to be UNCLOS, which does not specifically impose an obligation to
domestically criminalize piracy. According to Boister, that lacuna “rests on the assumption that piracy is
a crime in customary international law and there is no need for an explicit treaty obligation to criminal-
ize piracy in national law.” Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law 32
(2012).
282. See Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party
States, 35 New Engl. L. Rev. 363, 363–65 (2001) (collecting cites).
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1970 Hijacking Convention283 to the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Conven-
tion.284 The regular presence of both obligations does not prove that states
view universal jurisdiction as a consequence of an obligation to criminalize,
but it at least indicates that states believe there is an elective affinity be-
tween the two.
Second, 57 states provide for universal jurisdiction over an international
crime only when they are formally required to do so by treaty. The list
includes both powerful states such as Russia and China; weak states like
Bulgaria and Lesotho; and states in five of the six inhabited continents.285
Such practice is again not definitive of a relationship between universal ju-
risdiction and the obligation to criminalize, but it clearly undermines the
idea, inherent to the DCT, that universal jurisdiction is a consequence of
certain acts being directly criminalized by international law, making domes-
tic criminalization irrelevant. If that idea were true, we would expect a sig-
nificant number of states to adopt universal jurisdiction for core
international crimes even in the absence of a conventional obligation to do
so.  Yet few do.
Third—and most importantly—59 states explicitly condition the use of
universal jurisdiction on the territorial state being either unwilling or una-
ble to prosecute an international crime.286 A minority of those states, 28,
require the international crime to actually be criminal in the territorial
state—a double criminality requirement much like the one commonly
found in extradition treaties. Serbia’s universal jurisdiction provision is an
example:
Criminal legislation of Serbia shall also apply to a foreigner who
commits a criminal offence abroad against a foreign state or for-
eign citizen, when such offence is punishable by five years’ im-
prisonment or a heavier penalty, pursuant to laws of the country
of commission, if such person is found on the territory of Serbia
and is not extradited to the foreign state.287
The other 31 states are also willing to exercise universal jurisdiction when
the territorial state is unable to prosecute an act because it has failed to
incorporate the relevant international crime into its penal code.288 El Salva-
dor is typical:
283. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, arts. 2–3,
4(b), concluded Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
284. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Arts. 4(a), 6, adopted Jan.
12, 1998, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
285. All except Australia. Seven states also provide for universal jurisdiction over an international
crime when they believe a treaty permits it: Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ghana, Samoa, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uganda. See Appendix.
286. See id.
287. Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 9, Feb. 2006, http://www.osce.org/serbia/
18244?download=true.
288. See Appendix.
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[I]t is incumbent on each State to prohibit particularly grave of-
fences within its domestic legal system, as well as on the conse-
quent obligation of the State to exercise its jurisdiction when such
offences are committed on its territory. Furthermore, the recogni-
tion of the principle of universal jurisdiction has established the
possibility that one State may exercise its jurisdiction in the face
of the inaction or ineffectuality of another.289
The practice of the states in both of these categories explicitly supports the
NCT. All 59 states view universal jurisdiction as a subsidiary form of juris-
diction, one that can be used only when a state violates an international
obligation to effectively prosecute an international crime committed on its
territory.290 All 59 thus view universal jurisdiction as dependent upon a pre-
existing obligation to criminalize, because a state cannot have an interna-
tional obligation to effectively prosecute an international crime committed
on its territory if it is not obligated to domestically criminalize that interna-
tional crime in the first place.291 In other words, as El Salvador’s statement
explicitly affirms, an obligation to criminalize is inherent in the obligation
to prosecute.
Like the NCT itself, the idea that universal jurisdiction is a subsidiary
form of jurisdiction, available only when the territorial state has failed to
criminalize or prosecute an international crime, has a long pedigree. The
first serious international attempt to formulate the legal principles gov-
erning universal jurisdiction—the 1935 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, prepared by the Harvard Research Project—adopted
both double criminality and subsidiarity, permitting states to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction only “if the act or omission which constitutes the crime is
also an offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if surrender
of the alien for prosecution has been offered to such other State or States and
the offer remains unaccepted.”292 Similarly, two judgments routinely cited
as the earliest examples of courts affirming universal jurisdiction—the
NMT’s judgments in the Hostage and Einsatzgruppen293 cases—each explicitly
conditioned universal jurisdiction on the failure of the territorial state to
adequately address the commission of an international crime. In the Hostage
289. Statement submitted by El Salvador, reply to Sixty-Fifth U.N. G.A. on Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 18, at 5. R
290. See, e.g., id., Statement of Belgium ¶ 5 (“Accordingly, the rationale for universal jurisdiction is
to ensure that the perpetrators of the most serious crimes can be prosecuted when no other otherwise
competent court is able or willing to initiate proceedings. Universal jurisdiction is in a sense subsidiary
to the jurisdiction of the State in the territory of which a crime was committed.”).
291. See, e.g., Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (hereinafter “Belgium v. Sene-
gal”), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, ¶ 74.
292. Harvard Research in International Law: Contemporary Analysis and Appraisal 489
(John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2007).
293. Einsatzgruppen: see, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the
Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law 231-32 (2004). Hostage: see Prosecutor v. Kallon &
Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction, ¶ 68 (Mar. 13, 2004).
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case, the tribunal emphasized that universal jurisdiction exists over “an act
universally recognized as criminal” as long as “for some valid reason [it]
cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have
control over it under ordinary circumstances.”294 In Einsaztgruppen, the tri-
bunal took a similar position with regard to universal jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity:
Crimes against humanity are acts committed in the course of
wholesale and systematic violation of life and liberty. It is to be
observed that insofar as international jurisdiction is concerned,
the concept of crimes against humanity does not apply to offenses
for which the criminal code of any well-ordered state makes ade-
quate provision. They can only come within the purview of this
basic code of humanity because the state involved, owing to indif-
ference, impotency or complicity, has been unable or has refused
to halt the crimes and punish the criminals.295
Contemporary courts have also affirmed the subsidiary nature of universal
jurisdiction. In the Zimbabwe Torture Docket case, for example, the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa held with regard to a universal-jurisdiction
prosecution that “investigating international crimes committed abroad is
permissible only if the country with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to
prosecute . . . . Simply put, we may not investigate or prosecute interna-
tional crimes in breach of considerations of complementarity and
subsidiarity.”296
Moreover, although not strictly relevant from a positivist perspective, it is
worth noting that all of the leading philosophic defenses of universal juris-
diction—from Vattel297 onward—explain the permissibility of such juris-
diction by invoking the failure of the territorial state to address the
commission of an international crime.298 Win-Chiat Lee’s argument is typi-
294. Hostage, supra note 31, at 1241. R
295. United States of America v. Otto Ohlendorf et al. (hereinafter “Einsatzgruppen” ), TWC IV, at 498
(1948).
296. National Commissioner of The South African Police Service, supra note 223, ¶ 61. R
297. See Vattel, quoted in Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Munici-
pal Legal Perspectives 36 (2003) (noting that although “pirates are sent to the gibbet by the first
into whose hands they fall,” if “the sovereign of the country where the crimes of that nature have been
committed, reclaims the perpetrators of them in order to bring them to punishment, they ought to be
surrendered to him, as being the person who is principally interested in punishing them in an exemplary
manner”).
298. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1022, 1065 (2007) (claiming that the argu-
ment for universal jurisdiction “rests not on the notion that some wrongs are so grave that they must be
unlawful, but rather on the proposition that actually existing legal systems must address grave wrongs
that come before them if they are to justify their existence”); Anthony Sammons, The Under-Theorization
of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 Berke-
ley J. Int’l L. 111, 115 (2003) (“[T]he valid assertion of universal jurisdiction as the sole basis for the
prosecution of international crimes requires a conclusion that the state of the perpetrator’s nationality, or
of the crime’s commission, either has breached or failed to enforce its international obligations to such a
degree that partial assumption of its domestic jurisdiction is permissible.”); R. A. Duff, Criminal Respon-
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cal. After noting that states normally have exclusive legitimate authority to
punish crimes committed on their territory, he argues that states lose that
exclusivity when they fail to punish serious international crimes:
In the case of international crimes proper, however, that legiti-
mate authority is compromised by the serious harm perpetrated
against individuals under either state sponsorship or state acquies-
cence. Therefore, it can no longer act as the preemptory or over-
riding moral consideration that trumps others’ rights and duties
to bring about accountability for these crimes . . . . In this way,
universal jurisdiction over international crimes proper is really
nothing more than the corollary of the state’s loss of legitimacy in
monopolizing adjudication and punishment, in the form of exclu-
sive jurisdictions, in relation to these crimes.299
Insisting on the subsidiary nature of universal jurisdiction, however,
raises an important legal question: why should one state’s failure to prose-
cute an international crime committed on its territory permit any other state
to exercise jurisdiction over that crime? The only plausible answer is that
states view failing to prosecute an international crime as a violation of an
erga omnes obligation—an obligation owed to “the international community
as a whole.”300 As Kadelbach explains, all states are entitled to respond to
violations of erga omnes obligations, even those that are not directly harmed
by them:
Being defined as obligations vis-a`-vis the international commu-
nity of States, they impose special duties on the offending State
which may go beyond the bilateral reparation scheme which ap-
plies in reciprocal legal relationships. One of its elements is the
right of States not directly affected by an internationally wrongful
act to invoke the responsibility of the violator, be it on their own
behalf, on behalf of subjects of international law who are not in a
sibility, Municipal and International 25 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.trinitinture.com/docu-
ments/duff.pdf (“[W]e see local or national jurisdiction as the default position (bearing in mind that we
are focusing here only on crimes whose direct impact does not transcend national boundaries), and see an
international court [or domestic court] with universal jurisdiction as a safeguard or fallback for cases with
which, for whatever reason, the national courts cannot be expected to deal adequately.”); Andrew Altman
& Christopher Heath Wellman, A Defence of International Criminal Law, 115 Ethics  35, 46 (2004)
(arguing, in the context of universal jurisdiction, that a state’s right to “exclusive jurisdiction over
matters that concern only those within its territorial borders . . . rests on the state’s satisfactory perform-
ance of the requisite political functions”); Chehtman, supra note 199, at 101–02 (“Arguably, individu- R
als in S have a fundamental interest in there being a criminal rule in force in S against acts of torture,
murder, and the like perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic attack. Moreover, this interest is
not only incompatible with S holding an immunity against an extraterritorial authority punishing the
perpetrators of these international crimes, but also overrides the interest that explains that immunity.”).
299. Win-chiat Lee, supra note 74, at 32 (footnote omitted). R
300. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 33
(Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
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position to bring a claim themselves, or simply as members of the
international community of States.301
This explanation of universal jurisdiction, of course, raises a second impor-
tant question: why do states have an erga omnes obligation to prosecute inter-
national crimes committed on their territory? The answer brings us back to
the analysis presented above: because the defining characteristic of an inter-
national crime is that all states have a jus cogens obligation to domestically
criminalize the act in question. It is generally accepted, following the ICJ’s
suggestion in Barcelona Traction302 and its more specific (and more recent)
judgment in Belgium v. Senegal,303 that jus cogens norms give rise to correla-
tive erga omnes obligations.304 A state’s violation of a jus cogens obligation to
criminalize an international crime committed on its territory thus violates
an erga omnes obligation as well, thereby permitting all other states to exer-
cise universal jurisdiction over that crime.
A few legal scholars have specifically made this argument,305 as has the
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.306 More impor-
tantly, in Jorgic´ v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights, following
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, specifically relied on the relation-
ship between jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations to justify Germany’s
301. Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and other Rules—The Identification of Funda-
mental Norms, in The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens Obli-
gations and Erga Omnes 21, 26 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006); see also
Władysław Czaplin´ski, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Criminal Responsibility, in The
Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor
Bilshchenko 403, 407 (Jose Doria et al. eds., 2009) (same).
302. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 300, at paras. 33–34 (explaining that “obligations of a State R
towards the international community as a whole” derive from prohibitions on acts such as aggression and
genocide).
303. Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 291, at para. 68. R
304. See, e.g., Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Pinochet Case: International Human Rights Law on Trial, 71
Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 29, 34 (2000) (“[J]us cogens norms and obligations erga omnes are two sides of the
same coin.”) (italicization omitted).
305. See, e.g., id. at 35 (“For present purposes it suffices to conclude that jus cogens norms necessarily
apply erga omnes and that all States have a legal interest in their protection. The principle of universal
jurisdiction can be said to follow from this legal interest in the protection of jus cogens norms.”)
(italicization omitted) (footnote omitted); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785, 831 (1988) (same); cf. Carlo Focarelli, International Law as Social
Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice 475 (2012) (“There seems to be a necessary connec-
tion between universal jurisdiction and obligations erga omnes, assuming that a violation of international
law towards all states gives all of them an exceptional title to exercise their criminal jurisdiction without
any further jurisdictional link being necessary . . . .”) (italicization omitted); Antonio Cassese, When May
Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 853, 859 (2002) (arguing that, with regard to the perpetrators of international crimes, “one is at
a loss to understand why, if the national or territorial state fails to take proceedings, another state should
not be entitled to prosecute and try them in the interest of the whole international community”).
306. See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Nepal Conflict Report 67 (Oct.
2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_Nepal_Conflict_Report2012.pdf
(“Universal jurisdiction exists on the premise that some international norms are erga omnes, meaning
that the obligation is owed to the international community as a whole.”) (italicization omitted) (footnote
omitted).
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exercise of universal jurisdiction (on a subsidiary basis) over an act of
genocide:
[T]he Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention, despite
proposals in earlier drafts to that effect, had not agreed to codify
the principle of universal jurisdiction over genocide for the do-
mestic courts of all Contracting States in that Article . . . . How-
ever, pursuant to Article I of the Genocide Convention, the
Contracting Parties were under an erga omnes obligation to pre-
vent and punish genocide, the prohibition of which forms part of
the jus cogens. In view of this, the national courts’ reasoning that
the purpose of the Genocide Convention, as expressed notably in
that Article, did not exclude jurisdiction for the punishment of
genocide by States whose laws establish extraterritoriality in
this respect must be considered as reasonable (and indeed
convincing).307
The ICTY took a similar position in Furundzˇija regarding universal jurisdic-
tion over torture, defending the existence of such jurisdiction on the ground
that Serbia’s jus cogens obligation to criminalize torture implied an erga omnes
obligation to prosecute acts of torture committed on its territory.308
In short, the most compelling positivist rationale for universal jurisdic-
tion is that because all states are obligated to criminalize acts that qualify as
international crimes, a state violates an obligation toward the international
community as a whole when it allows an international crime to be commit-
ted on its territory—regardless of whether it considers the act in question to
be legal or considers the act criminal but refuses to prosecute it. Either way,
it is that state’s violation of the erga omnes obligation that justifies the (adju-
dicative) intervention of another state that has no preexisting connection to
the international crime.
E. Conclusion
Part III demonstrated that even the most generous understanding of posi-
tivism is incapable of justifying the idea that international crimes are di-
rectly criminalized by international law. This Part has demonstrated that
the NCT thesis has a much stronger positivist foundation. Indeed, it seems
clear that, at a minimum, international law imposes a jus cogens obligation on
states to domestically criminalize war crimes and genocide, justifying their
status as core international crimes.
The status of crimes against humanity under the NCT is less clear, but it
is most likely possible to find a jus cogens obligation if we emphasize the law-
making effect of the Preamble to the Rome Statute and resolutions of vari-
307. Jorgic´ v. Germany, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 287 (italicization omitted).
308. See Furundzˇija, supra note 33, paras. 151–56. R
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ous international organizations. We can also count the practice of the thirty-
three states that make universal jurisdiction available for crimes against hu-
manity but view universal jurisdiction as a subsidiary jurisdictional form.309
As we have seen, states in that category assume—either implicitly or explic-
itly—that all states have an obligation to criminalize crimes against
humanity.
Aggression, however, is a different story. It is simply not possible to ar-
gue that international law obligates all states to criminalize aggression,
which means that aggression is not universally criminal under international
law and cannot be considered—at least from a positivist perspective—a true
international crime. And that has two consequences. First, it means that
states are not entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over aggression, be-
cause it is widely accepted that the principle of non-intervention limits
states to exercising universal jurisdiction over acts that genuinely qualify as
international crimes.310 Second, it means that states could not create an in-
ternational tribunal capable of prosecuting an act of aggression no matter
where in the world it was committed. The jurisdiction of any such tribunal
would be limited to the pooled territorial and active-nationality jurisdiction
of the states that chose to join it—and would thus exclude acts of aggression
committed both by and against states that were not members of the
tribunal.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL/TRANSNATIONAL DISTINCTION
Rejecting the DCT in favor of the NCT does not require us to fundamen-
tally rethink the status of the core international crimes. It does, however,
undermine the traditional distinction between international and transna-
tional crimes. The DCT establishes a categorical distinction between the
two: international crimes are acts that are directly criminalized by interna-
tional law; transnational crimes are acts that individual states criminalize
domestically in response to obligations imposed by suppression conventions.
Milanovic´’s formulation of the difference is typical:
309. Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile,
Comoros, Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Germany,
Hungary, Israel, Kenya, Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Switzerland, Vietnam. This list is generated by cross-referencing the list of
states that view universal jurisdiction as subsidiary, see Appendix, with Amnesty International’s list of
states that have universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, see Amnesty International, supra
note 16, at 16–21. R
310. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: Interna-
tional Criminal Procedure 226–27 (2016); Florian Jessberger, Universal Jurisdiction, in Oxford
Companion to International Criminal Justice 556 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2009); Florian
Jessberger, The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction in German Criminal Law 4 (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ueber-die-fakultaet/professuren/professur-jessberger/forschung/
landesbericht-jessberger-2007.pdf.
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The so-called “suppression conventions,” such as the UN Con-
vention Against Torture, or the Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings . . . only create a state obligation to criminal-
ize certain acts domestically, without binding individuals di-
rectly, and unlike genocide, without having parallel customary
incriminations. These are not “true” or “core” international
crimes, which create individual responsibility independently of
domestic law, but merely “treaty” crimes, which cannot be pun-
ished in the absence of incrimination under domestic law.311
Now that we have rejected the DCT in favor of the NCT, we can see that
the international/transnational distinction is untenable. Because an interna-
tional crime is an act that all states have a jus cogens obligation to domesti-
cally criminalize, not an act that is directly criminalized by international
law, a suppression convention is no less capable of creating an international
crime than any other material source of custom. After all, as noted earlier, it
is not only generally accepted that law-making treaties are capable of con-
tributing to the formation of customary international law, the ICJ has even
held (controversially) that “very widespread and representative participation
in [a] convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States
whose interests were specially affected.”312 There is thus no reason why an
act deemed criminal by an exceptionally successful suppression convention
should not be considered a true international crime—especially where the
criminality of that act is buttressed by practice outside of the convention
and by normative resolutions of various international organizations.313 As
long as the obligation to criminalize the act in question is jus cogens, states
would be entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over the act and could
delegate that jurisdiction to an international tribunal, enabling it to prose-
cute the act no matter where in the world it was committed. That act would
thus satisfy the universality criterion that is the defining characteristic of an
international crime.
In fact, two acts normally considered transnational crimes already have a
very strong claim to international status under the NCT: torture and the
financing of terrorism.
311. Marko Milanovic´, Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care), 9 J.
Int’l Crim. Just. 25, 28 (2011); see also Simma & Paulus, supra note 10, at 308. R
312. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 62, at 43. R
313. Cf. P. Robinson, supra note 191, at 509–10 (noting, with regard to terrorism, that “the real R
distinction between core crimes and treaty crimes . . . and those established by treaties . . . consists in the
level and quality of support for them from the international community, that is, generality of practice as
the quantitative index of customary law, and the sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) as the qualitative
index of that law”).
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A. Torture
Although torture clearly qualifies as an international crime when it is
committed in the context of an armed conflict (a war crime314) or as part of a
widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population (a crime against
humanity315), few scholars consider an individual act of torture during
peacetime to be an international crime—even an act that satisfies the state-
centered definition of torture in the Torture Convention.316 Ambos insists,
for example, that “isolated incidents of torture do not amount to true inter-
national crimes,”317 because they do not entail “a serious violation of univer-
sal values and produce a collective concern among the international
community.”318 Similarly, Boister says that torture does not “shock the con-
science of international society sufficiently for it to take the step of classify-
ing torture as an international crime stricto sensu.” 319
A very strong case can be made, however, that international law imposes a
jus cogens obligation on all states to criminalize acts of state-sponsored tor-
ture. The Torture Convention itself, which requires each state party to “en-
sure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law,”320 has been
ratified by more than eighty percent of the world’s states—159.321 The Con-
vention clearly has “very widespread and representative participation,”
given that state parties come from every region in the world and include all
of the world’s major legal traditions, and it has even been ratified by “spe-
cially affected states” that are particularly notorious for state-sponsored tor-
ture, such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and the United States.322 Twenty-five
states, including those with particularly ignoble histories of state-sponsored
torture, have also ratified the American Convention on Human Rights,
which categorically guarantees the right to be free from torture323 and re-
quires each state party to “adopt, in accordance with their constitutional
processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”324
A significant number of states have acted on their treaty obligations. At
least ninety have incorporated the Torture Convention’s definition of torture
314. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 8(2)(a)(ii). R
315. Id., art. 7(1)(f).
316. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 24841 (requiring the severe pain or suffering be “inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity”) [hereinafter “Torture Convention”].
317.  Ambos, ICL Vol. II, supra note 220, at 245. R
318. Id. at 227.
319. Boister, supra note 10, at 967. R
320. Torture Convention, supra note 316, art. 4(1). R
321. See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications Interactive Dash-
board, Convention Against Torture, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last updated Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter
“Ratifications Interactive Dashboard, Convention Against Torture”].
322. Id.
323. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
324. Id., art. 2.
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into their domestic law325—more than have criminalized crimes against hu-
manity. Moreover, four states that have not ratified the Torture Convention
nevertheless criminalize torture: Bhutan, Comoros, Haiti, and Sudan.326
Practice of non-parties that is consistent with a treaty is widely considered
to provide compelling evidence that treaty provisions have led to the crea-
tion of a parallel customary rule.327 Eighty-five states also permit their
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over torture328—again more than for
crimes against humanity—and thirty-six of those states view universal juris-
diction as subsidiary to territorial jurisdiction.329
The General Assembly has also consistently emphasized that states have
an obligation to criminalize torture. In 1975, the General Assembly adopted
without a vote the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture,330 which provides that “[e]ach State shall ensure that
all acts of torture as defined in article 1 are offences under its criminal
law.”331 In 1977, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 32/64 without
a vote, calling upon all Member States to unilaterally declare that they in-
tended, inter alia, to “implement through legislation, and other effective
measures, the provisions of said Declaration.”332 And, of course, the General
Assembly adopts a resolution every year without a vote that affirms the ille-
gality of torture and “stresses that all acts of torture must be made offences
under domestic criminal law punishable by appropriate penalties that take
into account their grave nature.”333
Given this consistent state practice in favor of a universal obligation to
criminalize state-sponsored torture, how can scholars plausibly maintain
that isolated acts of torture are not international crimes because they fail to
sufficiently “shock the conscience of international society” or do not involve
“a serious violation of universal values”? That position is impossible to rec-
oncile with the widespread ratification of the Torture Convention, the sig-
nificant domestic criminalization of state-sponsored torture (including by
non-party states), and the General Assembly’s repeated condemnation of
325. See Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 13. R
326. See Status of Ratifications Interactive Dashboard, Convention Against Torture, supra note 321. R
327. See Shaw, supra note 98, at 96 (“[T]reaty provisions may lead to custom providing other states, R
parties and non-parties to the treaty fulfill the necessary conditions of compatible behaviour and opinio
juris.”) (italicization omitted); Baxter, supra note 98, at 278 (“[A]s is true of any rule extracted from the R
State practice of a number of nations, the force of the purported rule is enhanced or diminished by the
absence or presence of conflicting practice on the part of other States.”).
328. See Amnesty International, supra note 16, at 13. R
329. Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada,
Chile, China, Comoros, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Romania, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, Venezuela. Id. at 16–21.
330. G.A. Res. 34/3452 (XXX), annex, Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 9, 1975).
331. Id., art. 7.
332. G.A. Res. 32/64, annex, Model Unilateral Declaration Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 8, 1977).
333. A/HRC/22/L.11.
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state-sponsored torture and constant call for its criminalization. Indeed, it
seems to simply privilege scholarly perceptions of seriousness over the posi-
tion that states themselves express—an argument that is the antithesis of
positivism.
B. Financing Terrorism
If anything, the positivist case for considering financing terrorism to be
an international crime is even stronger than the case for torture. To begin
with, the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, which specifically requires
each state party “[t]o establish as criminal offences under its domestic law
the offences set forth in article 1,”334 is far more widely ratified than even
the Torture Convention, with 187 states parties—every state in the world
other than Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Iran, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan,
and Tuvalu.335 The sheer number of ratifications alone comes perilously
close to satisfying the North Sea Continental Shelf standard, especially given
that states parties include, with the exception of Lebanon and Iran, all of the
states that most notoriously finance terrorism. But that is not all: not only
have 151 states domestically criminalized terrorist financing along the lines
required by Article 1, three of the nine states that have not ratified the
Terrorist Financing Convention have nevertheless criminalized terrorist fi-
nancing—a group that includes Iran.336
UN resolutions have also consistently emphasized the obligation to
criminalize financing terrorism. Two unanimous Security Council resolu-
tions are particularly relevant in this regard: Resolution 1373 (2001), which
decided “that states shall . . .  [c]riminalize the wilful provision or collec-
tion, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in
their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts”337;
and Resolution 1456 (2003), which calls upon states to “comply fully” with
their obligations under Res. 1373338 and to “become a party, as a matter of
urgency, to all relevant international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism, in particular the 1999 international convention for the suppres-
sion of the financing of terrorism.”339 Similarly, the General Assembly
334. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 4, Dec. 9, 1999,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,075, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
335. For a list of states that have ratified the Terrorist Financing Convention, see U.N., Status of the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&clang=_en (last updated Mar. 7,
2017).
336. See Chair of the S.C. Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001), Letter dated 18
Jan. 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Con-
cerning Counter-Terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, at 71, U.N. Doc. S/2016/
49 (Jan. 20, 2016). The other criminalizing states are Lebanon and Tuvalu.
337. S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1(b) (Sept. 28, 2001).
338. SC Res. 1456, para. 1 (Jan. 20, 2003).
339. Id., para. 2(a).
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adopted Resolution 51/210 without a vote in 1997, calling upon states “[t]o
take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic mea-
sures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations,”340 and adopted
Resolution 68/276 without a vote in 2014, “[r]eiterating the obligation of
Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to
criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indi-
rectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories, with the intention
that the funds be used, or with the knowledge that they are to be used, in
order to carry out terrorist acts.”341
Given the virtually universal criminalization of terrorist financing and
these UN resolutions, “State practice, including that of States whose inter-
ests are specially affected,” has been “both extensive and virtually uniform
in the sense of the provision invoked” and has “occurred in such a way as to
show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is in-
volved.”342 It thus seems clear that international law obligates all states,
even those that have not ratified the Terrorist Financing Convention and
might be inclined to be persistent objectors, to domestically criminalize fi-
nancing terrorism—the basic requirement of the NCT. As a result, like
state-sponsored torture, terrorist financing qualifies as an international
crime: the existence of a jus cogens obligation to criminalize entitles states to
exercise universal jurisdiction over terrorist financing, and the permissibility
of universal jurisdiction entitles states to create an international tribunal
capable of prosecuting any act of terrorist financing committed anywhere in
the world.
C. Other Crimes
Similar positivist analyses could be conducted for a variety of other acts
criminalized pursuant to suppression conventions. At least three conventions
that require domestic criminalization of certain acts have been ratified by
more than ninety-five percent of the world’s states: the Chemical Weapons
Convention343 (192); the Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Convention344 (189); and
the Safety of Civilian Aviation Convention345 (188). Although beyond the
scope of this Article, it is likely that close examination would reveal the
same kind of “extensive and virtually uniform” post-adoption state practice
that we see for torture and terrorist financing. If so, international law would
340. G.A. Res. 51/210, para. 3(f), Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (Jan. 16, 1997).
341. G.A. Res. 68/276, pmbl., para. 14, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Review (June 24, 2014).
342. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 62, at 44. R
343. See Convention on the Prohibition, Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. 7(1), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
344. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, art. 3(1), Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164.
345. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian Aviation, art.
3, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
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require all states to criminalize acts such as the use of chemical weapons, the
cultivation of narcotics, and the destruction of aircraft, thereby permitting
states to exercise universal jurisdiction over them individually or collectively
via an international tribunal. Those acts would thus also qualify as interna-
tional crimes.
VI. CONCLUSION
International criminal law has always been haunted by the problem of
consent. Almost without exception, states, international courts, and scholars
have insisted that the defining feature of an international crime is its univer-
sality—both criminal and prosecutable no matter where in the world the act
in question is committed. And that insistence is sound: in the post-Nurem-
berg era, it is difficult to accept the idea that international law could toler-
ate, say, a state systematically exterminating a racial, ethnic, or religious
group simply because it refuses to criminalize genocide and is careful to
ensure that genocide takes place solely within its borders.
Asserting that international crimes are universally criminal, however,
does not explain how international law universally criminalizes. How could
genocide be criminal everywhere, even in a state that insists the systematic
extermination of its own people is legal? What justifies overriding state
sovereignty and enforcing the prohibition of genocide in the face of such
recalcitrance?
Since Nuremberg, one answer has dominated ICL: namely, that certain
acts—international crimes—are directly criminalized by international law
itself, making it irrelevant whether the territorial state considers those acts
legal. If a state refuses to prosecute international crimes that are committed
on its territory, the international community will do it for them, whether by
states exercising universal jurisdiction themselves or via the creation of an
international tribunal based on delegated universal jurisdiction.
That answer is both coherent and seductive. Unfortunately, as this Article
has shown, it is also indefensible if we take positivism seriously—as every
international tribunal since Nuremberg has insisted, if only in the breach,
that we must. States have simply never endorsed the idea of direct criminal-
ization: treaties do not affirm it; national incorporation of international
crimes does not reflect it; UN resolutions do not endorse it; and universal
jurisdiction is not based on it.
Direct criminalization, in short, is a naturalist idea, not a positivist one—
a well-intentioned but flawed concept created by the judges at Nuremberg,
codified by the ILC, and championed by generations of scholars. If we want
to ground ICL in positivism, we must accept a very different conception of
an international crime: namely, as an act that international law obligates all
states to domestically criminalize and prosecute. That conception, which I
have called the national-criminalization thesis, explains universal criminality
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as well as the direct-criminalization thesis and explains universal jurisdic-
tion far better. And unlike the DCT, the NCT has a solid basis in the actual
practice of states.
International criminal law thus has two options. The first is to maintain
fidelity to direct criminalization and openly acknowledge that the definition
of an international crime is inherently naturalist. But that is unlikely to be
an attractive option for most scholars—to say nothing of most judges—
because naturalism has come to be seen (rightly) as synonymous with a de-
gree of subjectivity and indeterminacy that is antithetical to ICL’s legiti-
macy. For good or for ill, we are (almost) all positivists now.
The second and more plausible option, then, is for ICL to accept the
NCT. That option has the virtue of maintaining fidelity to positivism,
thereby avoiding the dead end of naturalist debate: the inevitable scholarly
disagreement over what acts are so impermissible that they should be con-
sidered international crimes. Yet the NCT also has two significant draw-
backs, one practical and one theoretical. The practical drawback, which is
likely to make it a undesirable option for most judges and scholars—though
a desirable one for states—is that the NCT not only challenges the idea that
aggression is an international crime (much less the “supreme international
crime”),346 but also destabilizes the distinction ICL has traditionally drawn
between international and transnational crimes, significantly expanding the
category of acts that should be considered “true” international crimes.
The theoretical drawback is less evident, but for that very reason all the
more important to acknowledge: that it is possible, perhaps even likely, that
even the NCT is methodologically underdetermined. As we have seen, strict
adherence to positivism requires the existence of jus cogens norms—for the
obligation to criminalize no less than for direct criminalization. It may be
too strong to insist, with Me´gret, that such norms should be seen as “partic-
ipating in the creation of a peremptory supranational legal order and gradu-
ally emulating the old naturalist idea that there are binding norms over and
above, but most importantly independently of, sovereignty.”347 But there is
no question that the evidentiary requirements for jus cogens norms remain
opaque—and that precious few customary rules will qualify as jus cogens if
we take those (opaque) evidentiary requirements seriously. As a result, even
the NCT, with its superior positivist foundation compared to the DCT,
might be incapable of banishing naturalism entirely.348 Indeed, it is quite
possible that a residuum of naturalism—the need to nudge customary rules
346. IMT Judgment, supra note 57, at 421. R
347. Fre´de´ric Me´gret, The Creation of the International Criminal Court and State Sovereignty: The “Problem
of an International Criminal Law” Re-Examined, in 3 International Humanitarian Law: Prospects
47, 91 (John Carey et al. eds., 2006) (footnote omitted).
348. See, e.g., Jean D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law 15
(2011) (“[T]he formal identification of rules through a standard pedigree does not entirely stifle indeter-
minacy at the level of law-ascertainment. On the contrary, formalism inevitably brings about some
indeterminacy.”).
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over the jus cogens line—is simply inherent in ICL’s understandable quest for
universality. To paraphrase William James: when it comes to the existence
of international crimes, it may be turtles all the way down.349
349. The expression refers to the idea that all knowledge is perspectival, making objective knowledge
an unrealizable ideal. See, e.g., Isabelle Stengers, Power and Invention: Situating Science 62
(1997).
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